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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation employs both design science and behavioral science research 
paradigms to investigate an emerging form of technology-enabled human collective 
intelligence known as information markets. This work establishes a conceptual 
foundation for the study of organizational information markets and the design and use 
processes of information markets inside organizations.  
This research conceptualizes markets from an information systems perspective 
and presents an information systems research framework for organizational information 
markets. This work develops a systems theory of information markets to facilitate 
investigation of the relationships and interactions between markets as systems and their 
context of use. It proposes a structuration model for design and use of IT artifacts in 
organizations and applies it to the study of information markets. A framework of market 
users is developed to guide market design to satisfy the different motivational and 
informational needs of market users. A design based solution is proposed to an important 
open question in the information markets literature; how to generate sufficient 
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uninformed trades. This research extends structuration theory by developing the 
structuration model of technology-induced organization development. 
A well-designed information market can generate several benefits to 
organizations that contribute to their growth and development. Due to the importance of 
software in everyday life, and the high costs and percentages of failure in software 
projects, this dissertation proposes an information market solution to help organizations 
better manage the risks facing software projects. It also develops a theoretical framework 
for the determinants of software project risk assessment accuracy and evaluates the 
market‘s efficacy in improving assessment accuracy via the use of controlled laboratory 
experiments.  
The results of the experiments demonstrate the market‘s efficacy in improving 
assessment accuracy by increasing the currency, accuracy and completeness of reported 
status information about project main objectives such as cost, schedule, performance and 
functionality. The results also demonstrate the market‘s efficacy in increasing individual 
willingness to report negative status information by decreasing their perception of 
information asymmetry between them and management/clients, and by increasing their 
perception of both the anonymity of the reporting mechanism and their perceived self-
interest in reporting negative status information.   
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Chapter One 
 Motivation and Dissertation Objectives 
Motivation 
―If foresight is not the whole of management at least it is an essential part of it" 
(Henri Fayol, 1916) 
Foresight is the oldest term used to describe an interdisciplinary field known 
today as Futurology; or the study of the future. H.G. Wells envisioned the establishment 
of this modern academic discipline as early as the 1930‘s when he said in a BBC radio 
broadcast aired on November 19, 1932 ―There is not a single Professor of Foresight in the 
world‖. In the latter third of the 20th century, Futurology emerged as an academic 
discipline and Wells‘ foresight was realized, perhaps sooner than he could have 
imagined. But who could have imagined, few decades ago, that the most respected 
futurists of the 21
st
 century will not be professors, but rather markets? 
The Economist recently published a trends article titled ―The future of futurology‖ 
describing prediction markets as ―the most heeded futurists … where the informed 
guesswork of many is consolidated into hard probability‖ (The Economist 2007, p.1). 
The article cited several markets forecasts of political outcomes, such as those of 
NewsFutures, Inkling Markets, and InTrade. Other well known applications of prediction 
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markets, such as the Iowa Electronic Market, has proven to outperform polls and experts 
forecasts in predicting the outcomes of the presidential elections more than 75 percent of 
the time over the last ten years. In 2009, Hollywood Stock Exchange announced a 78.4% 
success rate in predicting the 81st Annual Academy Awards nominations, bringing its 11 
years average to an impressive 82.1%.  
The MIT center for collective intelligence calls for creating new forms of 
collective intelligence that take advantage of the opportunities created by the Internet and 
other new communication technologies, where human and machines can collectively act 
more intelligently than any individual, group, or collection of computers have ever done 
before. The center advocates prediction markets as a perspective on collective 
intelligence in its own right.  
Undoubtedly prediction markets are at the frontier of predictive futures and 
collective intelligence research. Their impressive performance holds great potentials for 
the business world in areas such as forecasting, decision making, and, importantly, risk 
management. The value of risk management, in any project, can be assessed based on 
three measures: the importance of the project itself or its outcomes, the likelihood of 
occurrence of the risks facing the project, and their expected impacts on the project 
objectives. Software development projects score very high on all of the scales.  
In the current era of ubiquitous computing, software is becoming an indispensable 
part of our daily lives, an absolute necessity for organizations to survive fierce 
competition with rivals, and even a matter of national security for governments. 
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Organizations and governments spend billions of dollars each year in new software 
initiatives and projects, and yet, by rough estimate, only about 35% succeed (Rubinstein, 
2007). Software failure can lead to tragic societal and economic consequences that go 
well beyond inconvenience. But the biggest tragedy of all, according to risk management 
expert Robert N. Charette, is that software failure is predictable and for the most part 
avoidable (Charette, 2005).  
The software development domain is in desperate need of better risk management 
tools and practices. Markets may prove to be invaluable in minimizing software projects‘ 
chances of failure. By aggregating status information from all levels of the organization 
and providing early warning signals about risks, markets can assume the difficult task of 
―blowing the whistle‖ on challenged projects. However, for markets to become 
mainstream risk management tools that inform strategic decisions, policy making and 
help in long term planning, organizations must first buy into them, understand how they 
work, know how to use them, and value the information they provide to inform their 
decisions.  
Research on prediction markets used inside organizations is still in its infancy. 
Little is known about the impact of organizational environments on market design, 
incentive structures, and types of questions asked in the market, or more simply put, what 
works and what does not. Little is also known about the impact of the market on work 
processes, corporate culture, and formal and informal reporting mechanisms in the 
organization.  
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Markets are, in essence, IT artifacts. To make the best out of this innovative 
technology, we must first theorize about it, and about the reciprocal relationship between 
it and its environment. We must understand how markets impact organizations, how the 
business setting impacts market design, and how design impacts use and, consequently, 
the market objectives. Also, studies are needed that empirically test the usefulness of 
prediction markets in managing risks facing organizations in general and software 
projects in particular. This dissertation is the first step in a long term research effort to 
accomplish these goals.  
Problem Statement 
A list of failed software projects states the problem loud and clear (Table 1). 
Software projects have a long history of failure that keeps repeating itself. Twenty years 
ago, the odds of a large software project finishing on time were close to zero (McConnell, 
1996). Today the odds are not much better, but at least we know they cannot get much 
worse. In 2006, 19 percent of initiated software projects in the US were outright failures; 
canceled before completion or not deployed. 46 percent of projects failed to meet user 
requirements, had cost overruns, or were not delivered according to schedule (Rubinstein, 
2007). In 2007, Dynamic Markets Limited surveyed 800 IT managers across eight 
countries. The results showed that failure rates are universal; 62 percent of IT projects 
failed to meet their schedules, 49 percent exceeded their budget, and 41 percent failed to 
deliver the expected business value and ROI.  
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Identifying the risks facing software projects and reasons behind their failures has 
occupied project managers, software industry consultants and academics for a long time. 
The most cited reasons are also universal. The literature is full of case studies, 
postmortem analyses, lessons learned, and recommended practices to improve the 
processes and outcomes of software projects. However, management is still unable to 
effectively manage the risks involved in these projects.  
Although current risk management approaches can be useful in identifying and 
prioritizing risks, as well as in suggesting mitigation strategies, none of them addresses 
the fundamental problem behind software project failure; communication.  Many large 
scale software disasters have been attributed to communication problems and inaccurate 
status reporting, such as the case of the CONFIRM project (Oz, 1994). Reluctance to 
transmit bad news (Kiel, Smith, Pawlowski and Jin, 2004), and both status misperception, 
and deliberate misrepresentation by software developers and project managers (Snow and 
Keil, 2002) are some of the reasons that lead to inaccurate assessments of risks and, 
eventually, project failure.  
Existing risk management tools and initial risk assessments are ineffective in 
reducing a software project‘s chances of failure unless there are methods that 
continuously provide complete, current, and accurate information about the status of 
project objectives as events unfold. Otherwise managers are left with unrealistic, dated 
assessments of project risks, and as a result fail to take appropriate actions to mitigate 
them.  
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Table 1: Software Hall of Shame (From Charette, 2005) 
Year Outcome Costs in US $ 
2005 Hudson Bay Co. (Canada) Problems with Inventory system contribute to $33.3 million loss.  
2004-05 UK Inland Revenue Software errors contribute to $3.45 billion tax-credit overpayment.  
2004 Avis Europe PLC (UK) Enterprise resource planning (ERP) system canceled after $54.5 million 
Is spent.  
2004 Ford Motor Co. Purchasing system abandoned steer deployment costing approximately 
$400 million.  
2004 J Sainsbury PLC (UK) Supply-chain management system abandoned after deployment costing 
$527  
2004 Hewlett-Packard Co.  Problems with ERP system contribute to $160 million loss  
2003-04 AT&T Wireless Customer relations management (CRM) upgrade problems lead to 
revenue loss of $100 million.  
2002 McDonalds Corp. The Innovate information-purchasing system canceled after $170 million 
Is spent.  
2002 Sydney Water Corp. 
(Australia) 
Billing System canceled after $33.2 million is spent.  
2002 CIGNA Corp.  Problems with CRM system contribute to $445 million loss 
2001 Nike Inc. Problems with supply-chain management system contribute to $100 
million loss 
2001 Kmart Corp. Supply-chain management system canceled after $130 million Is spent  
2000 Washington D.C. City payroll system abandoned after deployment costing $25 million. 
1999 United Way Administrative processing system canceled after $12 million is spent  
1999 State of Mississippi Tax system canceled after $11.2 million is spent; state receives $185 
million damages. 
1999 Hershey Foods Corp. Problems with ERP system contribute to $151 million loss.  
1998 Snap-on Inc. Problems with order-entry system contribute to revenue loss of $50 
million  
1997 U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service 
Tax modernization effort canceled after $4 billion is spent.  
1997 State of Washington Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) system canceled after $40 million 
is spent.  
1997 Oxford Health Plane Inc. Billing and claim system problems contribute to quarterly loss; stock 
plummets, leading to $3.4 billion loss in corporate value. 
1996 Arianespace (France)  Software specification and design errors cause $350 million Ariane 5 
rocket to explode 
1996 FoxMeyer Drug Co. $40 million ERP system abandoned after deployment forcing company 
into bankruptcy. 
1995 Toronto Stock Exchange 
(Canada) 
Electronic trading system canceled after $25.5 million is spent.  
1994 U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Advanced Automation System canceled after $2.6 billion is spent.  
1994 State of California DMV system canceled after $44 million is spent 
1994 Chemical Bank Software error causes a total of $15 million to be deducted from 100 000 
customer accounts.  
1993 London Stock Exchange 
(UK] 
Taurus stock settlement system canceled after $600 million is spent.  
1993 Allstate Insurance Co. Office automation system abandoned after deployment costing $130 
million. 
1993 London Ambulance Service 
[UK]  
Dispatch system canceled In 1990 at $1125 million; second attempt 
abandoned after deployment, costing $15 million. 
1993 Greyhound Lines Inc. Bus reservation system crashes repeatedly upon introduction, 
contributing to revenue loss of  $61 million. 
1992 Budget Rent-A-Car, Hilton 
Hotels, Marriott 
International and AMA 
(American Airlines) 
Travel reservation system canceled after $165 million Is spent.  
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Dissertation Objectives 
This dissertation seeks to accomplish the following objectives: First, establish a 
theoretical foundation for the study of organizational information markets and the design 
and use processes of markets inside organizations. Second, define the relationships and 
interactions between information markets and their environment. Third, design an 
information market solution to help organizations overcome an important business 
problem; software project risk assessment. Fourth, evaluate the proposed information 
market‘s efficacy in increasing assessment accuracy by empirically testing the market 
ability to: 
1. Efficiently collect and combine information from the organization to provide 
an assessment based on “complete” information about the status of different 
project objectives, such as scope, quality, cost and schedule,  
2. Respond to unfolding events by rapidly incorporating new information into 
the assessment to provide current and up-to-date assessment of risk, 
3. Adjust for individual errors in perception of project status and risk assessment, 
and thus, provide more accurate assessment of risk.  
4. Motivate those who are involved in the project or have access to information 
about its progress to faithfully report status information. 
8 
 
Research Approach 
Technology and behavior are inseparable in an information system and thus ought 
to be inseparable in IS research (Hevner, March, Park and Ram, 2004). The IS field needs 
an interdisciplinary conceptualizations of the IT artifact that articulate what the 
technology is, how it interacts with the social context (Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001). ―IT 
artifacts are broadly defined as constructs (vocabulary and symbols), models 
(abstractions and representations), methods (algorithms and practices), and instantiations 
(implemented and prototype systems)‖ (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 77).  
Hevner et al. (2004) argue that IS research is conducted in alternating cycles 
between design science (technology) and behavioral science (behavior). The design 
science paradigm in essence is a problem solving paradigm rooted in engineering and the 
sciences of the artificial (Simon, 1996). It is concerned with building innovative IT 
artifacts to solve an identified organizational problem or fulfill a business need. People‘s 
perceptions, roles and capabilities within the organization, as well as the organization‘s 
strategies, structures and cultures, and their existing and planned technologies form the 
problem space of business needs which warrants the relevance of design science research. 
Design science is also concerned with evaluating the IT artifact based on the 
utility provided in solving those problems. Evaluation can be carried out via case or field 
studies, lab experiments or simulation. Evaluation then feeds back into the design process 
to improve current understanding of the problem, the designed artifact, and the design 
process itself (Hevner et al., 2004).      
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On the other hand, the behavioral science paradigm studies the IT artifact by 
developing and justifying theories to explain and predict its use and impact on individuals 
and organizations. The goal of behavioral science is truth that informs design, and the 
goal of design science is utility that informs theory (Hevner et al., 2004). Theories as well 
as designed artifacts are assessed for weaknesses, refined, and reassessed multiple times 
until they accomplish their intended goals (Figure 1).         
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Information Systems Research Framework (From Hevner et al., 2004) 
 
Rigor is guaranteed by the application of existing knowledge such as foundational 
theories, frameworks, instruments, constructs, models, methods and instantiations in 
developing theories and building the artifact, and by the application of existing 
methodologies such as data collection and analysis techniques, measures and validation 
criteria in justifying theories and evaluating artifacts. The contributions of IS research are 
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assessed based on the applicability of the artifact in the problem space, its ability to meet 
the business need, and the research‘s ability to add to our knowledge base (Hevner et al., 
2004).   
Thus, we are utilizing both the design science and behavioral science research 
paradigms to accomplish our research objectives. To establish a theoretical foundation for 
the study of information markets inside organizations, this research starts by re-
conceptualizing markets as IT artifacts and presents an information systems research 
framework for information markets. It employs and extends several theoretical 
perspectives such as systems thinking concepts (Checkland, 1981) and structuration 
theory (Giddens, 1979) to facilitate investigation of the relationships and interactions 
between markets and their context of use, and the design and use processes of markets 
inside organizations.  
The design science research paradigm is employed to design an experimental 
Web-based information market solution to aid organizations and project managers in 
assessing software project risks (Figure 2). Market design is informed by existing 
theories, methodologies, and empirical evidence in the information markets and software 
project management literatures. The proposed market design and its expected utility in 
the area of software project risk assessment are evaluated using controlled experiments.  
Experimental studies on the use of information markets for business problems that 
use business-related tasks and scenarios are needed to advance the theory of 
organizational information markets to explain and predict information markets 
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performance in specific business settings. They provide sufficient degrees of control that 
allow us to draw conclusions about manipulation effects and causality, which in turn will 
allow us to build theoretical models to explain and predict the impact of various 
information markets designs on key business-related dependent variables. Experimental 
results can also be used to refine market design and will contribute back to our 
knowledge base.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Design Science Approach for Designing and Evaluating an IT Solution for 
an Identified Business Problem 
 
Following the design science research guidelines proposed by Hevner et al. 
(2004), we advance a research approach for designing and evaluating IT artifacts 
developed to fulfill an identified business need (Figure 2). The proposed approach for 
conducting design science research starts by organizing research questions into two sets: 
IT artifact design and IT artifact design evaluation. IT artifact design research questions 
IT Artifact Design 
RQ1: What is the design of the artifact? 
        State artifact nature and specific design 
RQ2: What is the artifact’s expected utility? 
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IT Artifact Evaluation 
RQ3: What is the artifact’s efficacy in 
providing hypothesized utility?   
        Decide on evaluation method 
        Test hypotheses 
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ask about (1) the nature and the specific design of the proposed IT solution, and (2) its 
expected utility for the identified business need. After the nature and the proposed artifact 
design are articulated along with the theories and literature that inform the design, the IT 
artifact‘s expected utility is stated in form of testable hypotheses.  
IT artifact design evaluation research questions ask about the efficacy of the 
designed artifact in providing its hypothesized utility in a particular business domain. To 
test the hypotheses and answer design evaluation research questions, an appropriate 
evaluation method should be selected such as laboratory experiment or field studies 
supported with appropriate literature, and then the hypotheses can be tested by collecting 
the required data and analyzing it using appropriate data analysis techniques. Evaluation 
results can then be used to modify the artifact design and/or selected evaluation method, 
and will enhance our understanding of the problem either by developing or extending 
existing theories, or by adding empirical evidence to our knowledge base. The evaluated 
IT solution is then applied in a particular domain to help solve an identified business 
problem.   
Research Questions  
The IT artifact design research questions are: 
RQ1- What is the design of an information market for software 
projects risk assessment?   
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RQ2- What is the expected utility of the designed information 
market for software projects risk assessment? 
Information markets are expected to improve the accuracy of software projects 
risk assessment by improving the currency, accuracy and completeness of reported status 
information about projects various objectives such as scope, cost, quality and schedule. 
IT artifact evaluation research questions: 
RQ3- What is the efficacy of an information market providing 
complete, current, and accurate information about software 
project risks? 
Research Description and Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the theory and practice in the information systems 
literature, software project management literature, and the information markets literature.  
Research on information markets has increased significantly in the last 5 years 
and yet there have been few reviews that cover the theoretical underpinnings of 
information markets and synthesize existing studies to make this knowledge accessible to 
information systems researchers. The information markets literature review presented in 
this dissertation is considered a contribution because it seeks to stimulate more general 
interest in information markets and suggests fruitful areas for future research. 
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This dissertation establishes a theoretical foundation for organizational 
information markets by conceptualizing markets from an information systems perspective 
in four different ways; as IT artifacts, systems within bigger systems, business intelligent 
tools, and consensus making systems, and by developing a systems theory of information 
markets. These conceptualizations along with the developed theory facilitate 
investigation of the relationships and interactions between markets and their context of 
use, and are an important first step towards building new information systems theories 
about organizational information markets to describe, explain and predict their behavior 
and impacts on organizations.  
Attaining a better understanding of the design, implementation and use processes 
of IT artifacts in organizations is vital to devise design, implementation and use 
guidelines and procedures that promote effective structuration process that leads to 
organization development. This dissertation proposes a structuration model for design 
and use of IT artifacts in organizations, and applies it to the study of information markets. 
It also provides guidance on the design of information markets, their interfaces and 
information visualization used by developing a framework of market users to guide 
market design to satisfy users‘ motivational and informational needs.  
This research extends Giddens‘ structuration theory (Giddens, 1979) by 
developing the structuration model of technology-induced organization development that 
defines a goal and an ultimate outcome for the structuration process of IT artifacts. This 
model conceptualizes design as a group of decisions, envisions the design process as a 
15 
 
decision making process, considers technology as a catalyst for organization change and 
development, and views the structuration process as a continuous change process that 
objectifies changeability as an organizational permanent structure that leads to 
organization development. 
A well-designed information market provides utility to organizations that over the 
long run might lead to their growth and development. This dissertation proposes various 
ways by which organizations can utilize information markets to improve their assessment 
of software project risks. For example, an information market can be designed to monitor 
the status of each project objective in addition to the project overall riskiness level. It can 
also be used to predict the impact of a range of risk factors or the likelihood of various 
impact levels of a particular risk factor.    
To answer our research questions, this dissertation proposes an experimental 
information market design solution for software project risk assessment. The forecasting 
goal of the market is the project riskiness level. The outcomes being forecasted are ―high 
risk‖, ―medium risk‖, and ―low risk‖. Riskiness level is defined in terms of the number of 
unmet objectives. Project main objectives are cost, schedule, functionality and 
performance. Objectives are considered unmet when they exceed a certain threshold over 
their planned limit. For example, cost exceeds budget by more than 15%. The higher the 
number of unmet objectives, the higher the overall riskiness level of the project.  
To test the designed information market efficacy in providing complete, current, 
and accurate information about software project risks, two controlled laboratory 
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experiments are conducted. The results of the experiments provide evidence to 
information market efficacy in improving risk assessment accuracy by aggregating 
information from all participants in the market to provide more complete, current and 
accurate assessment of risks than any individual group of participants. The results also 
prove that markets can increase employees‘ willingness to report negative status 
information by reducing employees‘ perception of information asymmetry, providing 
incentives for truthful revelation of status information, and by protecting employees‘ 
identities from being exposed.  
This research contributes to the software project risk management literature by 
proposing an innovative technology-based solution to risk assessment problems, along 
with a theoretical framework for the determinants of risk assessment accuracy. The 
results of the experiments improve our understanding of the factors that increase the 
accuracy of software projects status reports and consequently software project risk 
assessment and provide evidence to the market effectiveness in improving software risk 
assessment accuracy, which will consequently reduce software projects chances of failure 
and save organizations billions of dollars. This research highlights an additional benefit 
for information markets besides their anonymity and incentives offered for truthful 
trading; the ability to influence participants‘ perceptions of information asymmetry which 
can be very useful to organizations if utilized properly.    
This dissertation contributes to the information markets literature by first 
proposing a design-based solution to an important open question in the information 
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markets literature; how to generate sufficient uninformed trades required for information 
markets to function properly. Second, it provides a closer look at markets‘ information 
aggregation and dissemination processes by conducting laboratory experiments using 
realistic information structure, business-related tasks and scenarios. Third, it evaluates an 
innovative application of information markets in business. This in turn will allow us to 
build theoretical models to explain and predict the impact of various information markets 
designs on key business-related dependent variables.  
Dissertation Organization  
The reminder of this dissertation is organized in three major chapters. Chapter 
Two reviews the literature and the theoretical underpinnings of information markets. 
Chapter Three establishes a conceptual foundation for the study of organizational 
information markets and employs several theoretical perspectives to define the 
relationship between markets and organizations. Chapter Four utilizes a design science 
approach to design a technology enabled information market solution to aid organizations 
in managing risks facing software development projects and evaluates the market‘s 
efficacy in solving the identified problems using two controlled experiments. Chapter 5 
completes the dissertation with a summary of the research contributions and observations 
on future research directions. 
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Chapter Two 
 Information Markets: Theory and Literature Review  
Introduction  
This chapter begins by reviewing the theoretical underpinnings for information 
markets. It then provides a closer look at information markets structure and design. 
Successful applications of markets in general areas such as politics, entertainment, and 
sports are reviewed next. We also review the few studies that empirically investigate the 
use of information markets in a business setting, to forecast sales and project delivery 
dates. The following section discusses the market advantages compared to other 
information aggregation and forecasting methods used in organizations today. This 
chapter concludes by identifying areas for future research. 
Information Markets Theoretical Base 
Hayek Hypothesis 
Information markets are a distinct form of futures markets whose main purpose is 
to aggregate information about uncertain future events. The ability of markets to 
aggregate information dispersed among individuals can be traced back to Adam Smith 
(1776) and his invisible hand theory. The invisible hand process works via free markets 
and division of labor where outcomes are produced in a decentralized way with no 
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explicit agreement between thousands of independent, utility maximizing agents whose 
aims are neither coordinated nor identical with the actual outcome, yet bringing wealth to 
their nations. This vision of decentralized planning of economies that secures the best use 
of knowledge in society is what Hayek (1945) believed can only be maintained through 
the free markets price system.  
Thus, according to the Hayek hypothesis, a society is composed of individuals, 
each spatially separated from others or decentralized, who have only partial local 
knowledge of a phenomenon.  Each individual‘s thoughts and beliefs are diverse and 
independent. It does not matter if only few know about a certain circumstance, as long as 
they all act and think independently seeking their self interest. Under these conditions, 
free markets can collect, coordinate, and ensure cooperation where the whole act as one 
bringing about, in form of prices, a collective wisdom purified from cognitive problems 
of those few (Surowiecki, 2004). 
Rational Expectations Theory 
The information aggregation property of prices is what gave rise to information 
markets. This property was formalized by Muth (1961) in the theory of rational 
expectations and price movement. According to rational expectations theory, individuals 
take all available information into account in forming expectations about future events.  
In a perfectly competitive market, the rational expectation equilibrium is the 
intersection point of supply and demand curves. Buyers and sellers make sequential 
trades at discrete points in time with imperfect information bringing about the price 
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observed in the market. The process of acquiring information in the market advances 
traders through different states ranging from no information to perfect information. As 
traders discover and learn, they adjust their expectations, and the observed price 
consequently evolves in a series of disequilibrium price adjustments to an expected price 
which theoretically should soon become the equilibrium (Hess, 1972).   
Random Walk Theory  
Understanding prices‘ behaviors and their formation process in order to predict 
future prices has attracted economists, market analysts, and investors‘ attention for many 
years. It is a fascinating area of study and a great way of making money. There are three 
major schools of thought with regard to how prices form; technical, fundamental value, 
and random walk. While all agree that market prices form through series of successive 
price adjustments, it is why these adjustments take place and how independent they are, 
that make them disagree. 
Technical analysts, also known as chartists, assume that the series of past price 
changes has memory and the past tends to repeat itself. They carefully analyze historical 
price changes to identify patterns to help them predict future prices and eventually 
increase their chances of making profit.  On contrary to this implied dependency 
assumption, random walk theorists assume independence. In other words, patterns 
identified cannot be used to predict future changes and any profit made using technical 
analysis cannot exceed those made by chance, or by using a buy and hold trading strategy 
(Fama, 1965b). A Random Walk Down Wall Street (Malkiel, 1973) can even convince 
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investors that buy and hold strategy is best since attempts to outperform the market based 
on technical, fundamental, or any other forms of analysis are vain. 
Fundamental value analysis is consistent with the random walk independence 
assumption. Fundamental value analysts believe that each security has an intrinsic value. 
They evaluate the company‘s earnings, dividend policy, the riskiness of their 
investments, and the political and economic factors affecting them to estimate securities 
value and expected return. Changes in market prices can be caused by disagreement 
between traders on how valuable securities are, new information arriving at different 
points in time, or by the mere accumulation of random noise due to individuals‘ 
impulsive betting behavior (Fama, 1965a). The arrival of new information or the noise 
created by irrational behavior can cause prices to change in a dependent way to levels 
above or below their intrinsic values. However, experienced intrinsic value analysts will 
shortly notice that activity and act quickly by selling or buying, thus, driving price levels 
back towards their intrinsic values and eliminating any dependence in successive price 
changes (Fama, 1965a).  
Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970), which requires traders to 
have rational expectations, is connected to random walk theory. The EMH asserts that 
markets are informationally efficient, and thus are impossible to beat. In other words, 
prices of traded assets reflect all available information about future prospects of the asset. 
Since prospects are analogous to events. Prices in efficient information markets reflect all 
22 
 
available information about the likelihood of the events. Thus, information markets 
utilize market efficiency to harness the collective knowledge of participants to predict the 
likelihood of future events.  
Modern behavioral finance has shown that people make systematic errors when 
predicting the future. This irrational behavior could also arise due to emotional errors 
(Clark, 2007), wishful thinking, or making mistakes, biased or not (Forsythe, Rietz, and 
Ross, 1999). These behaviors create market inefficiencies and anomalies in prices that 
may be inexplicable via any available hypothesis (Fox, 2002; Rosenberg, Reid and 
Lanstein, 1985).  
However, information markets effectiveness seems to be immune to irrationality. 
Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and Wright, (1992) analyzed Iowa political stock market 
data to test the market ability to aggregate information about political events. Trader level 
analysis showed that some traders appeared rational while others exhibited substantial 
cognitive and judgmental biases, such as assimilation-contrast and false-consensus 
effects. In spite of that, the market forecasts were notably accurate. 
Marginal Trader Hypothesis 
In efficient information markets, it does not really matter if all traders are rational 
or not, as long as the marginal trader is rational and motivated by profit; the market 
generated forecast will be fairly accurate (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and Wright, 1992; 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). The marginal trader hypothesis claims that ―marginal 
traders who are influential in setting market prices are all that is needed for the Hayek 
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hypothesis to succeed‖(Forsythe et al., 1999, p. 84). The marginal traders are those who 
submit limit orders close to the market price. While those who are inactive, make only 
market orders, or make limit orders at prices far away from market prices are not 
considered marginal (Forsythe et al., 1999). 
Each market trade is determined by two separate acts, or two trader roles: a 
market maker submitting a limit order and a price taker accepting it (submitting a market 
order). Traders self select into these two roles. Violations of the law of one price, the no-
arbitrage assumption, and those of individual rationality, can be classified into price 
taking and market making violations (Oliven and Rietz, 2004). Even though average 
traders might exhibit judgment biases, marginal traders, or market makers, are who 
determine whether markets are efficient or not (Oliven and Rietz, 2004).  
Studies have found that marginal traders appear to behave more rationally, exhibit 
less biased trades, and are more experienced and knowledgeable (Forsythe et al., 1992; 
Forsythe et al., 1999; Oliven and Rietz, 2004). It is worth noting though, that a market 
maker cannot exist without a price taker, otherwise the no-trade theorem will bind and 
traders will not agree to disagree (Aumann, 1976; Milgrom and Stocky, 1982). It is still 
an important open question in the information markets literature on how to attract those 
price takers, despite their possible irrational behavior, to participate in trading due to their 
critical role in executing trades (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006).   
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A Closer Look at Information Markets  
Information markets, often known as prediction markets, but also referred to as 
decision markets, event markets and idea futures, are an emerging form of futures 
markets created to aggregate information, rather than to hedge risks. Information markets 
can be organized into two main categories as shown in Figure 3 based on the market 
objective for which the information is aggregated (Jones, Collins, and Berndt, 2009). 
Verifiable outcomes information markets seek to predict the likelihood of future states of 
either a discrete or a continuous variable. Unverifiable outcomes information markets 
allow participants to either create or choose among alternative or courses of action.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Information Markets Typology (From Jones at al., 2009) 
 
Thus, information markets can be used to aggregate information about a wide 
range of events, such as sports outcomes, interest rates, marketing campaigns, and 
Information Markets 
Idea Futures 
(Discovery of 
new 
Alternatives) 
Decision Markets 
(Choice between 
alternatives that 
create the future) 
Prediction Markets 
(Predict future 
events) 
Estimation Markets 
(Choice between 
continuous 
alternatives) 
Event Markets 
(Choice between 
discrete 
alternatives) 
Unverifiable Verifiable 
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research ideas. Although markets differ in many respects, such as market design and 
incentive structure, they generally consist of one or more events for which you would like 
a reliable forecast.  
The standard contract in the market is the binary contract, aka winner-take-all. It 
costs a certain amount and pays off, for instance, $1 if and only if the event occurs, and 
nothing otherwise. Traders buy and sell contracts of future events based on their beliefs 
in the events likelihood of occurrence. For example, if a trader believes the event is going 
to happen, s/he will buy contracts in the event. But if a trader has information to the 
contrary, s/he will sell contracts in the event. Contract prices and events probabilities are 
positively correlated. The higher the likelihood of the event the higher its contract price 
and vice versa. The result is a trading price that tracks the consensus opinion (Hanson, 
1992), and can be interpreted as market-aggregated forecast of the event probability 
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). For example, if a contract price is selling for $70, that 
means there is a 70% chance of the event happening.  
Market Design 
Based on research results in the fields of experimental economics, financial 
markets, and political stock markets, Spann and Skiera (2003) grouped main aspects of 
information markets design into three categories, outlined in Figure 4.  
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Forecasting Goal 
The choice of forecasting goal is concerned 
with the types of questions asked about future 
events. In other words, what is specifically being 
predicted. Predicted events must be easy to verify 
and future outcomes must be easy to measure.  
Questions can be formulated to predict the 
occurrence/ nonoccurrence of an event, such as 
whether a project will be delivered on a specific 
date or not. Other questions can predict numbers 
such as units sold, or sales in dollars or percentages 
such as market share, or election vote share. 
Questions must be clear, and easy to understand. 
They must be interesting enough to attract traders, 
and controversial enough to sustain trading.  
Portfolio Composition  
The designer of the market must decide on the composition of traders‘ initial 
portfolios and on whether traders will use their own money to buy shares, or will be 
given an initial endowment of shares. Another related design issue is the use of real or 
play money.  Real money might motivate traders to collect more information about the 
events. On the other hand, it might deter informed, but risk adverse, traders from 
Choice of forecasting goal
• Selection and description of 
prediction issue
Incentives for participation 
and information revelation 
• Composition of initial portfolios
• Choice of incentive mechanism
Financial market design
• Choice of trading mechanism and 
market rules
Figure 4: Steps for Designing a 
Virtual Stock Market (from 
Spann and Skiera, 2003) 
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participating. Additionally gambling laws might restrict the use of real money markets, 
making the play money alternative plausible. In terms of predictive accuracy, studies 
have shown that real and play money markets result in equally accurate predictions 
(Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock and Galebach, 2004). 
Incentive Structure  
Designers must also decide on an incentive structure to motivate traders to 
participate, and to truthfully reveal what they know about an event. After all, a trade 
requires a trader to put her money where her mouth is. The incentive structure, and the 
type of contracts used, can elicit the collective expectations of a range of different 
parameter, such as the probability, mean or median value of an outcome (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz, 2004). For example, when the outcomes of an event are mutually exclusive, 
such as (yes/no), or (occur/not occur), the binary contract, described in the previous 
section, can be used to elicit the event‘s probability of occurrence. The same applies to 
events with more than two mutually exclusive outcomes. State-contingent or winner-
take-all contracts can be used, and their prices can be interpreted as the collective or the 
market forecast of the event probability. As long as the no arbitrage condition is satisfied 
though. In other words, the sum of prices of the traded state-contingent contracts should 
be exactly equal to the payoff of the winning contract (Chen, Fine and Huberman, 2001). 
For example, in case of binary contracts, if the winning contract pays off a $100, the sum 
of prices of the two traded contracts must be equal to a 100 (e.g. Yes $40, No $60). 
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Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), a well known real-money prediction market, used 
winner-take-all contracts to predict the outcomes of the 2008 U.S. presidential elections 
(Table 2). IEM‘s winner-take-all prediction market opened in June 2006. The founder of 
the IEM, Professor Tom Rietz, said ―the IEM traders saw Obama's win even before 
anyone knew who the two parties' nominees would be.‖ At midnight the day before the 
election, prices indicated a 90 percent probability that the Democratic candidate would 
win the popular vote (IEM press release, Nov 5, 2008). 
Table 2: IEM 2008 US Presidential Election Winner Takes All Contracts 
Code Contract Description 
DEM08_WTA      
   
$1 if the Democratic Party nominee receives the majority of popular votes 
cast for the two major parties in the 2008 U.S. Presidential election, $0 
otherwise 
REP08_WTA $1 if the Republican Party nominee receives the majority of popular votes 
cast for the two major parties in the 2008 U.S. Presidential election, $0 
otherwise 
 
 
Figure 5: IEM 2008 US Presidential Election Winner Takes All Market 
(Source: http://iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu/graphs/graph_PRES08_WTA.cfm) 
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In support for Professor Rietz statement, Figure 5 shows that for more than two 
years the democratic contract price never once dropped below the republican. Prices were 
exceptionally responsive to unfolding events on the campaign trail, and fluctuated around 
primary, caucus, and major party convention dates.  
When forecasted outcomes are numbers or percentages, such as sales in dollars, 
vote count, or percentage of vote share, index contracts can be used that pay off 
proportionately to the outcomes (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). IEM vote share contracts 
(Table 3) are examples of index contract.      
Table 3: IEM 2008 US Presidential Election Vote Share Contracts 
Code Contract Description 
UDEM08_VS $1.00 times two-party vote share of unnamed Democratic nominee in 2008 
election 
UREP08_VS     $1.00 times two-party vote share of unnamed Republican nominee in 2008 
election 
 
Prices on the IEM's Vote Share Market (Figure 6) predicted the percentages 
received of the two-party presidential popular vote to within half percentage point: the 
market predicted 53.55 percent for Barack Obama, and 46.45 percent for John McCain. 
After the ballots were counted, Obama received 53.2 percent of the vote, and McCain 
received 46.8 percent (IEM press release, Nov 24, 2008). 
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Figure 6: IEM 2008 US Presidential Election Vote Share Market 
(Source: http://iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu/graphs/graph_PRES08_VS.cfm) 
 
The price of index contract represents the market mean expectation of the 
outcome. On the other hand, a spread contract with even money bet represents the 
market‘s expectation of median outcome, and is used to forecast whether outcomes will 
exceed a certain cutoff point, such as a candidate receiving more than a certain vote share 
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Table 4 summarizes the discussed contract types. 
 Table 4: Information Markets Contract Types 
 
 
 
Contract Type Payoff Parameter 
Winner-take-all Pays $1, $0 otherwise Probability 
Index Proportionate to outcome Mean 
Spread Double money if outcome exceeds 
cutoff point; $0 otherwise 
Median 
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Trading Mechanism  
The choice of market trading mechanism is another important aspect of market 
design. The dominant market trading mechanism is the continuous double auction 
(CDA), where bids, submitted by buyers, and asks, submitted by sellers, wait in queues to 
be executed. Bids are sorted by prices in descending order and then by posting time in 
ascending order; while asks are sorted by prices then by time, both in ascending order to 
facilitate matching with pending bids. The continuous double auction (CDA) mechanism 
poses no risk on the market institution, provides incentives for continuous incorporation 
of information, and offers the option of cashing out by selling shares at the currently 
offered bid price. However, CDA might suffer from illiquidity due to market thinness, or 
wide bid-ask spread (Pennock, 2004).  
Continuous double auction with market maker (CDAwMM) are the bookie 
mechanisms used for sports betting. This trading mechanism guarantees liquidity by 
transferring the risk involved to the market institution. Pari-mutuel mechanism also 
guarantees liquidity without posing any risks on the market institution; however, unlike 
CDAwMM, it does not continuously incorporate information into the price, but rather 
waits until the event can be identified with certainty (Pennock, 2004).      
Market scoring rule (MSR), invented by Hanson (2003, 2007), can elicit forecasts 
over many combinations of outcomes and from both individuals and groups. MSR 
combines the advantages of information markets and scoring rules while solving the thin 
market and irrational betting problems of standard information markets, as well as the 
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information pooling problems of simple scoring rules. MSR is currently used at Inkling 
Markets, the Washington Stock Exchange, BizPredict, and several other markets. 
David Pennock (2004) developed a novel market mechanism called dynamic pari-
mutuel market (DPM) that is used at Yahoo! Tech Buzz Game. DPM combines some of 
the advantages of both Pari-mutuel and CDA markets, yet like all other mechanisms has 
its own limitations. Table 5 summarizes the pros and cons for the various available 
market mechanisms as discussed by Pennock (2004).   
Table 5: Market Mechanisms Pros and Cons 
Market Mechanisms Advantages Disadvantages 
Continuous Double Auction 
(CDA) 
2,3,4 Fails 1 
Continuous Double Auction 
with Market Maker 
(CDAwMM) 
1,3,4 Fails 2 
Pari-Mutual (PM) 1,2 Fails 3 and 4 
Dynamic Pari-Mutual (DPM) 1,2,3,4 5,6 
Market Scoring Rule (MSR) 1,3,4 Fails 2,  but risk is 
bounded 
Bookie (Bookmaker) 1,3,4 Fails 2 
  
1. Guaranteed liquidity 
2. No risk for the market institution 
3. Continuous incorporation of information 
4. Ability to cash out by selling before the market closes 
5. Pay off depends on the price at the time, and final pay off per share 
6. One sided nature (only accept buy order) 
 
Information Markets Applications  
While research on information markets has witnessed an exponential growth in 
the number of published articles in the last ten years (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007), 
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prediction markets have been around for a long time. Betting on political outcomes has a 
long tradition in the United States, with large and formal markets, such as the New York 
betting market, operating for over three-quarters of a century (Rhode and Strumpf, 2004). 
These markets have had a very large volume of activity and a notable predictive accuracy 
(Rhode and Strumpf, 2004). 
Today, the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), the most well known application of 
information markets, is offering markets in which traders can bet on a wide variety of 
events ranging from the outcomes of presidential elections, to the periodic interest rate 
decisions of the Federal Reserve‘s Open Market Committee (Hahn and Tetlock, 2006). 
Since 1988, prices on the IEM have proved more accurate than traditional polls in 
forecasting elections more than 75 percent of the time, with an average absolute error of 
only 1.5 percentage point, compared to 2.1 percentage points for polls (Berg, Forsythe, 
Nelson and Rietz, 2003; Forsythe et al., 1992; Hahn and Tetlock, 2006).  
Market forecasts can be used to inform decisions made by political parties, such 
as nominating presidential candidates that are likely to win, as well as decisions made by 
the candidates themselves regarding their campaigns strategy such as what issues to focus 
on. The idea of using markets for decision support was first introduced by Hanson (1999) 
when he used the concept of decision markets, or conditional markets, to illustrate how 
market forecasts can be used to inform decisions about an event, given market predictions 
of another. Berg and Rietz (2003) provided an elaborate analysis of the 1996 presidential 
election market, and described how market prices can be used to support decisions; for 
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example, market forecasts suggested that Dole was not the strongest candidate in the set, 
so the Republican Party could have used market prediction to support a stronger 
candidate with a better chance of beating Clinton (Berg and Rietz, 2003).  
The Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX) is another successful application of 
information markets. Traders in the HSX buy and sell shares of their favorite actors or 
movies causing securities‘ prices to rise or fall. Traders evaluate movies by collecting 
information from movies websites, readings critics‘ reviews and blogs, and interacting 
with fan communities to form beliefs about movies‘ potential prospects. Prices of 
securities are used to predict Oscar, Emmy, and Grammy award winners and movie box 
office returns. The predictions have proved to be highly correlated with actual outcomes. 
In 2009, players correctly predicted 29 of 37 Oscar nominees for the 81st Annual 
Academy Awards, a 78.4% success rate, bringing HSX‘s 11 year average to an 
impressive 82.1% (HSX press release, Jan 22, 2009).  
The HSX is being used as a market research instrument where movies‘ box-office 
prerelease forecasts are used to determine marketing budget, the number of movie 
screens, and related promotional activities (Eliashberg and Sawheny, 1996; Spann and 
Skiera, 2003). Spann and Skiera (2003) analyzed the HSX forecasting accuracy for 152 
movies, and compared market predictions to two renowned experts‘ predictions. They 
also analyzed the market performance in many other areas, such as predicting the number 
of movie visitors, and chart position of pop music singles in Germany, and even in 
predicting the usage of different mobile phone services of a large German mobile phone 
35 
 
operator. Market predictions were fairly accurate. Results showed that markets work well 
under different incentives structures and with small number of participants.  
There are many other successful Web-based implementation of information 
markets designed to aggregate information and forecast events in many areas such sports, 
politics, finance, law, entertainment, and even the weather. Some examples of real money 
information markets include Intrade, TradeSports, Nadex and BetFair. Other examples of 
play money markets are NewsFutures, Inkling markets, and the Foresight Exchange.  
In 2006, over 25 companies in the United States had started to experiment with 
information markets (King, 2006). Today the number has at least doubled and companies 
have moved beyond the experimentation stage. Microsoft is using the market to predict 
software quality issues, such as the number of bugs in new software application, Google 
is using it to predict dates of product lunches and GE is using it to choose the best new 
research ideas (Schonfeld, 2006). AT&T, Yahoo, Corning and Best Buy are just a few 
examples of the many Fortune 500 companies that have begun to seriously use the market 
in various areas.  
In a series of experiments at Hewlett-Packard laboratories, markets outperformed 
official HP forecasts 75% of the time in predicting printer sales and the DRAM 
microchip prices (Chen and Plott, 2002; Schonfeld, 2006). Ortner (1997, 1998) 
conducted an experiment using information markets at Siemens Austria to forecast delays 
and reveal information about software project progress. Results showed that market 
prices anticipated delays long before the official release of information, proving the 
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usefulness of using markets in the software project management arena. The Milestone 
Market (www.milestonemarket.org) at the University of South Florida is being deployed 
for software cost estimation and software project management where market contracts are 
defined for each set of milestones, and are tied to defined cost and time estimates 
(Berndt, Jones and Finch, 2006).   
Intel integrated an information market designed to forecast demand into the 
company‘s standard forecasting processes. The results of early experiments showed that 
market forecasts are stable, responded well to demand fluctuations, and were at least as 
accurate as the official forecasts, with 75% of market forecasts falling within 2.7% of 
actual sales (Hopman, 2007). 
In addition to aggregating information, and forecasting events, markets can be 
used to study how organizations process information (Cowgill, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz, 
2008). The Cowgill et al. (2008) analysis of Google‘s internal prediction market showed 
how markets can be used to track information flow within the organization and how it 
responds to external events. 
Information Aggregation Methods 
Organizations employ various methods to elicit forecasts and aggregate 
information held by members of a group. When the issues at hand are purely factual, 
statistical groups can be used by asking a large group of individuals and calculating the 
statistical mean or median of their answers (Sunstein, 2005).  
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However, when the group is anchored by a misleading number or the group 
members are ignorant to the issue at hand, the likelihood that the group will decide 
correctly decreases as the size of the group increases (Sunstein, 2005). 
Alternatively, deliberation can be used to improve group decision making through 
discussions and debates, especially when the issues are normative rather than factual 
(Sunstein, 2005). Armstrong (2006) presented the case against face-to-face meetings, 
demonstrating how ineffective and inefficient traditional group meetings are at 
aggregating information. Groups often produce inaccurate outcomes because of 
informational and social influences (Sunstein, 2005).  
Sunstein (2005) argued that informational influence occurs when group members 
announce their information by conduct, conclusions or by reason-giving; influencing 
other group members not to disclose any information to the contrary. On the other hand, 
social influence leads individuals to conform to higher status group members fearing 
disapproval, or social sanctions of various sorts. These influences impair group judgment 
by emphasizing shared information, creating hidden profiles, cascade effects, and group 
polarization (Sunstein, 2005). 
Additionally, individual group members have limited information processing 
capabilities and therefore rely on heuristics such as representativeness, availability, 
framing, anchoring, and adjustment to reduce the cognitive load of predicting values or 
assessing probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The use of heuristics reduces 
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complex tasks to much simpler judgmental tasks, creating biases and errors in individual 
judgments that are propagated, and often amplified, in group settings.     
The Delphi method is utilized to diminish the informational and social influences 
of deliberative groups. The Delphi technique uses a self-administered questionnaire and a 
system of controlled feedback wherein a group of experts participate in anonymous 
rounds of estimates and feedback until the degree of convergence reaches a desired 
threshold. Members are allowed to communicate their judgments and conclusions 
anonymously in the form of summary statistics along with their justification and 
reasoning behind them. Experts can then respond to the forecasts and justifications of 
others and revise their own based on the feedback they receive. Finally, individual 
judgments are statistically aggregated (Armstrong, 2001).     
Rowe and Wright (1999) reviewed 25 empirical studies that evaluated the 
effectiveness of the Delphi method in terms of forecast accuracy and quality. Their 
review showed that Delphi outperformed both statistical and interactive groups roughly 
over 80% of the time. Although the Delphi technique proved to improve forecasting and 
decision making, it has its own limitations. In addition to the possible difficultly of 
recruiting experts in any area of interest, Delphi does not have an incentive structure to 
motivate experts to reveal their true beliefs. Also, Delphi does not allow incorporation of 
additional information into the forecasts because it offers results only at a certain point in 
time (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007).  
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Information Markets Advantages   
Much of the enthusiasm for using information markets as a method of forecasting 
and information aggregation comes from the inadequacy of existing methods to 
accomplish this task. Information markets are being used to overcome the limitations of 
the various aforementioned methods.  Green et al. (2007) discussed how information 
markets can avoid the drawbacks of Delphi. First of all, markets are not restricted by 
experts‘ availability, instead, traders self select to participate in the market if they believe 
their private information is not yet incorporated into the market price. Second, markets 
offer incentives for true revelation of beliefs. Monetary incentives eliminate group 
pressure to conform, where traders can only benefit by trading according to their own 
beliefs. Third, unlike Delphi, markets are dynamic and responsive to changing 
circumstances. Prices in information markets incorporate new information almost 
instantly, providing continuous and up to date forecasts of events.  
Information markets offer many other advantages over existing methods (Table 
6). First, Web-based implementations of information markets are not restricted by 
location or time. Traders can participate from around the globe, 24-7.  Second, markets 
are more cost effective and time efficient than other information aggregation methods. 
The process of price formation and discovery collects disparate information scattered 
around the organization or around the world in a matter of hours, and at relatively little to 
no cost. Third, market trading is anonymous. Anonymity plays a pivotal role in reducing 
social and informational influences that prevail in group settings. Fourth, trading 
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dynamics in a market setting cancel out individual biases and errors preventing cascading 
effects from impact forecasts (Forsythe et al., 1992; Forsythe et al., 1999; Oliven and 
Rietz, 2004).  
The substantial body of experimental research on information aggregation (e.g. 
Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990; Sunder, 1992, 1995; Forsyth et al., 1992; Plott, 2000; 
Plott and Sunder, 1982; Plott and Sunder, 1988) suggests that markets seem to work 
fairly well in a wide variety of settings. Empirical studies on information markets prove 
the feasibility of using the market in a business setting to forecast a variety of events 
(Chen and Plott, 2001; Ortner, 1997, 1998). Further, research has shown that markets are 
robust to manipulation and insider trading (Hanson and Opera, 2004; Hanson, Opera, and 
Porter, 2006), and produce forecasts that are at least as accurate as existing alternatives, 
such as opinion polls and experts‘ predictions (Berg, Nelson and Rietz, 2003; Chen and 
Pennok, 2005; Forsythe et al., 1992; Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004). 
Table 6: Information Markets’ Advantages 
Why Information Markets? 
Web-based Robust to manipulation 
No time or place restrictions Anonymous 
No experts required Save time and money 
Offer continuous up to date forecasts Biases and errors proof 
Versatile  Dynamic and responsive to unfolding events 
Offer Incentives for honesty    High forecasting accuracy 
 
Information markets‘ impressive performance holds great potentials for the 
business world. Studies that test the usefulness of information markets in various areas of 
business are greatly needed.  
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Future Research Directions  
Research on how information markets are used inside organizations is still in its 
infancy. Little is known about the impact of the business environment on market design, 
incentive structure, and types of questions asked in the market, or more simply put, what 
works and what does not. Little is also known about the impact of the market on work 
processes, corporate culture, and formal and informal reporting mechanisms in the 
organization.  
Future research should investigate the impact of different incentives structures 
and the type of market mechanism used (e.g. pari-mutuel, continuous double auction, 
market scoring rules) on the market‘s forecasting accuracy. Studies should also 
investigate the impact of incentive structures and market design on organizations‘ 
decisions to adopt the market and traders‘ motivations to participate in it. For example, 
different trading mechanisms have different associated learning curves which may affect 
the market perceived ease of use, and consequently, organizations‘ decisions to adopt the 
market. It may also require traders to employ different trading strategies that involve a 
greater cognitive effort to analyze information and to participate in market trading; thus 
discouraging them from participating in the market.    
Moreover, future research should empirically compare information markets to 
other methods of information aggregation, such as the Delphi method, not only in terms 
of forecasting accuracy but also on multiple other dimensions, such as the nature of 
forecasting problems appropriate for each method, sources of relevant information (e.g. 
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external, internal, or a mix of both), the availability of public information to attract 
participants, the availability of experts in certain areas, and the costs involved in 
recruiting experts, acquiring the market, training, trading time, incentives, etc.   
Comparative studies seek to fill in gaps in the literature, satisfy researchers‘ 
curiosity, and help put everything in perspective. One might argue that the value of new 
innovations can be better appreciated relatively rather than in absolute terms. However, 
we caution against using forecasting accuracy as the sole basis for comparison between 
markets and other existing methods. It is important to keep in mind when evaluating the 
effectiveness of information markets what made them attractive in the first place. 
Available methods of forecasting and information aggregation such as polls, surveys and 
the Delphi method have their own limitations, and produce inaccurate forecasts all the 
time.  So are we really doing markets justice by comparing them to error-prone 
benchmarks?  
Further, unintended uses of markets might emerge that bring additional benefits to 
organizations, rendering them incomparable to other methods. Markets bring about a 
unique mix of involvement and enjoyment that other methods do not provide. By 
promoting democratic participation in decision making and idea generation, organizations 
might be able to increase employees‘ loyalty, job satisfaction, and retention rates. 
Research is needed to study such questions.  
Information markets impact on organizations‘ hierarchy and control structures 
and on their relationships with employees, customers, partners, and strategic allies might 
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change the way business is done forever. These unanticipated benefits might create a 
stronger motivation to adopt information markets than their predictive accuracy. 
Information markets are innovative tools to harness the collective intelligence buried in 
organizations. They hold great promises for business that are only limited by our own 
innovation to realize them.     
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Chapter Three 
A Foundation for the Study of Organizational Information Markets  
Introduction  
The term ―collective intelligence‖ has long been associated with non-human 
societies such as bacteria, insects, and animals. Perhaps human pride has deterred 
individuals from admitting that ―none of us, is smarter than all of us‖, until advanced 
communication technologies, the World Wide Web, and the Internet have made this fact 
evident to the world (Servan-Schreiber, 2008). Google, Wikipedia, and information 
markets are three examples of human collective intelligence enabled by the Web that are 
designed to aggregate existing information to enhance existing knowledge. However, 
information markets have the additional benefit of generating new reliable knowledge 
about the future (Servan-Schreiber, 2008).      
Information markets, also known as prediction/decision markets, are a form of 
futures markets designed to aggregate disparate information and intuitions about the 
likelihood of uncertain future events. Traders bet on the chances of the event by buying 
shares if they believe the event is going to happen and selling shares if they believe 
otherwise. The price of the traded shares in the event can be interpreted as the market 
consensus forecast of the event‘s probability (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Once the 
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event‘s outcomes (e.g. occur/not occur) can be determined with certainty, shares payoff 
according to the actual outcome.      
The most well known application of information markets is the Iowa Electronic 
Market (IEM), established at the University of Iowa in 1988, to predict the outcomes of 
the U.S. presidential elections. Since its inception, IEM has demonstrated an impressive 
predictive performance with an average absolute error of only 1.5 percentage points 
compared to 2.1 percentage points for Gallup polls (Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, and Rietz, 
2003). Over the long run, the market predictions were closer to the actual election result 
74% of the time when compared to 964 polls over the five Presidential elections since 
1988 and outperformed the polls in every election when forecasting more than 100 days 
in advance (Berg, Nelson, and Rietz, 2008).  
The Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX) is another successful application of 
information markets used to predict Oscar, Emmy, and Grammy award winners and 
movie box office returns. In 2009, Hollywood Stock Exchange announced a 78.4% 
success rate in predicting the 81st Annual Academy Awards nominations, bringing its 11 
years average to a remarkable 82.1% (HSX press release, Jan 22, 2009).   
Market forecasts can be used to inform decisions about forecasted events. For 
example, IEM forecasts can be used to inform decisions made by political parties, such as 
nominating presidential candidates that are likely to win, as well as decisions made by the 
candidates themselves regarding their campaigns strategy and the issues to focus on 
(Berg and Rietz, 2003). Similarly, HSX forecasts can be used by movie production 
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companies to determine marketing budget, the number of movie screens, and related 
promotional activities (Eliashberg and Sawheny, 1996; Spann and Skiera, 2003).  
Information markets‘ outstanding performance in predicting future events such as 
elections outcomes and other issues of public interest, coupled with an increasing interest 
in finding more efficient alternatives for information aggregation, has inspired the 
corporate world to start experimenting with information markets. Yahoo, Google, 
Microsoft, GE, HP, Intel and many other fortune 500 companies are now using 
information markets to forecast business related issues, such as product delivery dates, 
product sales, market demand, and software quality issues.    
Although the number of companies adopting information market technology is on 
the raise, it is still less than 1% of the target audience (Gartner, 2008) and despite the 
enthusiasm for using information markets for business forecasting, research on 
information markets used inside organizations is still in its infancy. It is expected that 
information markets will reach main stream adoption within 5 to 10 years (Gartner, 2008) 
and yet little is known about the impact of the business environment on market design, 
incentive structure, and types of questions asked in the market, or more simply put, what 
works and what does not. Little is also known about the impact of the market on work 
processes, corporate culture, and formal and informal reporting mechanisms in the 
organization.  
Information markets are, in essence, IT artifacts. To make the best out of this 
innovative technology, we must first theorize about the technology itself and about the 
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reciprocal relationship between markets and their environment to develop an 
understanding of how information markets‘ use impacts organizations, how the business 
setting impacts market design, and how design impacts use and consequently the market 
objectives.  
As a first step to systematically investigate the design and use processes of 
markets inside organizations, this chapter theorizes about information markets from an 
information systems perspective. The next section presents an information systems 
research framework for information markets, and re-conceptualizes markets as IT 
artifacts. Section three employs systems thinking concepts to develop a systems theory of 
information markets to facilitate investigation of the relationships and interactions 
between markets as systems and their context of use. 
Section four briefly reviews Giddens‘ structuration theory and its use in the 
information systems field and defines information markets from a structuration 
perspective. Section five proposes a structuration model for design and use of IT artifacts 
in organizations and applies it to the study of information markets. A closer look at 
information markets design and use is presented in the following two sections, where a 
framework of market users is proposed to guide market design to satisfy users‘ 
motivational and informational needs. 
Our conceptualization of the structuration process of IT artifacts in general and 
information markets in particular is summarized in the structuration model of technology-
induced organization development, that extends Giddens‘ structuration theory by 
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considering technology as a catalyst for organization change and development and the 
structuration process as a continuous change process that objectifies changeability as an 
organizational permanent structure that leads to organization development. Conclusions 
and future directions conclude this chapter. 
Markets as IT Artifacts 
Information markets are at the frontier of predictive futures and collective 
intelligence research. Their impressive performance holds great potentials for the 
business world in areas such as forecasting, decision making, and risk management. 
However, the relationship between information markets and organizations has not been 
fully investigated.  
The information systems research framework (Figure 7) and the design science 
research guidelines suggested by Hevner et al. (2004) can be used to structure the 
methods and activities performed by IS researchers designing/studying organizational 
information markets. The information systems research framework encompasses two 
complimentary, however distinct paradigms: the behavioral-science and the design-
science paradigms. The behavioral-science paradigm provides guidance ―to develop and 
justify theories that explain or predict organizational and human behavior involved in the 
analysis, design, implementation, management, and use of information systems‖ (Hevner 
et al. 2004, p. 76).  
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The design-science paradigm is a problem solving paradigm that seeks to develop 
innovative technological solutions (i.e. IT artifacts) to identified business problems that 
exist in the problem space as defined by its surrounding environment (Simon, 1996). IT 
artifacts can be constructs, models, methods, or instantiations that provide utility in 
addressing those problems and are produced via two design processes: build and evaluate 
(March and Smith, 1995). Foundational theories inform the artifacts‘ design and 
evaluation, and are developed following the artifacts‘ implementation and use to explain 
their impacts on the environment (Hevner et al., 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Information Systems Research Framework for Information Markets 
(Adapted from Hevner et al., 2004) 
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aggregation, forecasting, and decision making under uncertainty. However, the build and 
evaluate loops used to produce the information market are informed by foundational 
theories and methodologies rooted in reference disciplines such as economics 
(experimental and behavioral), finance, psychology, and political science. As a result, 
current studies tend to view information markets through reference disciplines lens: as a 
financial market, or an economic entity (e.g. Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright, 
1992). 
The tendency to study the IT artifact, and its intimately related issues, through 
varied reference disciplines lens is particularly concerning in the IS field. Orlikowski and 
Iacono (2001) argue that although the information systems field is premised on the 
centrality of information technology in everyday life, IS research does not live up to this 
premise. The authors observed that IS researchers tend to under-theorize their field‘s core 
subject matter, the IT artifact, and instead give central theoretical significance to the 
context where the technology is absent or black boxed, to the processing capabilities of 
the technology abstracted from its socioeconomic context, or to the deterministic impact 
of the technology on some dependent variable.     
IS studies that investigate the design and use processes of organizational 
information markets and their interactions with the business environment are greatly 
needed. However, existing literature on information markets and its current knowledge 
base might tempt IS researchers to black box the market, undermine the importance of its 
interaction with the environment, or downplay the impacts of its technological and 
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structural aspects on the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations adopting 
information markets.  
Although markets are socially constructed, focusing too much on the 
socioeconomic context, or treating the market as either an independent or a dependent 
variable, rather than focusing on the technology itself, moves us away from our main role 
of investigating IS specific phenomena, and makes it easy to substitute the IS in our 
research with anything else; making our contributions indistinct from those of other 
disciplines (Benbasat and Zmud, 2003). 
Thus, the first step in studying organizational information markets is to 
reconceptualize markets as technology-enabled information systems (i.e. IT artifact). 
Technology is limited to the hardware and the software components of the market, and 
the information system encompasses the design, development, implementation, and use 
processes of the market, as well as the dynamic interaction between the market, people, 
and its environment to accomplish a certain task. This conceptualization ―white boxes‖ 
the market, in the sense that it clears some of the doubts surrounding information markets 
that are mainly due to the black box nature of markets and organization‘s lack of general 
understanding of its internal workings. It also serves as grounds for theorizing about 
information markets from an information systems perspective.             
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A Systems Theory of Information Markets 
Systems thinking framework (Checkland, 1981) is a useful theoretical lens 
through which markets as systems can be defined, and the structures underlying these 
systems and their emergent properties can be understood. It can also be employed to 
investigate the relationship between IT artifacts and their context of use such as the 
organization. Systems thinking framework is being applied to study organizations, 
analyze organizational problems, and develop solutions by viewing organizations as 
systems operating within a bigger system (e.g. industry) and in continuous interaction 
with their external environment (e.g. competitors) and internal subsystems (e.g. 
departments) (Checkland, 1981; Davis and Olson, 1985; Senge, 1990).  
Systems thinking‘s holistic analysis approach enables organizations to see the big 
picture that helps them solve complex problems effectively (Senge, 1990). Instead of 
isolating the problematic parts of the system, systems thinkers examine interaction 
patterns and interrelationships between systems and subsystems which allow them to 
uncover dependencies among actions and to understand how problems, as well as 
solutions, propagate from one system to the other. As a result, systems thinkers choose 
actions that result in better long terms solutions, instead of those that result in temporary 
desirable effects that may, over the long run, worsen the problem (Checkland, 1981; 
Senge, 1990). 
At the center of systems thinking is the concept of the ―adaptive whole‖ 
(Checkland, 1999) which can be useful in understanding the relationship between IT 
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artifacts, such as information markets, and their context of use.  An adaptive whole is an 
entity that has ―emergent properties‖ in its own right that make the whole larger than the 
sum of its parts. It can be part of a larger whole, or contain smaller wholes, each with its 
own emergent properties, organized in some form of a ―layered structure‖. An adaptive 
whole survives in a changing environment by having automatic or man-made 
―communication and control‖ mechanisms with its environment that allows it to sense 
changes and adapt accordingly (Checkland, 1999).    
 
Figure 8: A Systems Theory of Organizational Information Markets 
 
A systems perspective on organizational information markets views the market as 
an adaptive whole organized as part of a layered structure of adaptive wholes 
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encapsulating each other (Figure 8). An information market is a subsystem of the 
organization system in which it is used. The organization in turn operates within an 
industry, all of which operates in the largest system of all: the world.  
Recent research has attempted to reshape current thinking about information 
markets, and called for investigating markets from a business intelligence perspective. 
Yassin (2009, p.2) argued that ―the spirit of business intelligence lies at the heart of 
information markets‖ and that markets used within organizations are in essence business 
intelligence tools that aggregate and summarize intelligence from multiple sources to 
enable accurate forecasting about future market trends and potential risks, and 
consequently make better informed decisions.  
Intelligence is ―information acquired to aid the purposeful execution of business 
processes‖ and business intelligence is ―inferences and knowledge discovered by 
applying algorithmic analysis to acquired information‖ (March and Hevner 2007, 
p.1032). The market aggregation mechanism (e.g. continuous double auction, pari-
mutual, scoring rules) does not only collect and aggregate intelligence from multiple 
sources but also determines how the information is collected, which makes it an adaptive 
whole that has its own structures and properties (Figure 8).  
An information market encapsulates the aggregation system and its emergent 
properties (e.g. intelligence), along with the market incentives and contracts structures, 
and produces an emergent property that makes the market larger than the sum of its parts; 
collective intelligence in form of equilibrium price. An organization then analyzes the 
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intelligence stored in the market such as historical price trends, trading volume, buying 
and selling transactions, in addition to the collective intelligence produced by the market 
(i.e. equilibrium price) to draw inferences and make interpretations and predictions about 
future events, industry trends, and potential risks.  
Each system engages in a process of cybernetic information exchange with its 
environment and has its own ways of responding to and communicating with the system 
in which it operates, as well as with other systems. For example, an information market 
communicates information to traders, to decision makers, and to the organization in form 
of demand and supply cues and trading prices. It also controls participation by means of 
incentives offered and contracts used in the market.  
The organization impacts market participation and traders‘ beliefs in the events 
being forecast through industry reports, official forecasts, project status reports, and the 
feedback it receives from the industry regarding its performance relative to competitors. 
Similarly, market information can be used to measure organization performance by 
comparing market forecasts to official forecasts. Thus, a systems theory of information 
markets facilitates theorizing about the relationship between markets and organizations 
and about the impact of the business environment on market design and use by focusing 
on the big picture and analyzing interactions between systems, subsystems and their 
emergent properties.   
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Structuration Theory in Information Systems  
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984) is another useful theoretical lens 
through which markets as IT artifacts can be defined and the relationship between the 
market and its environment can be understood. Among social theories, Giddens‘ 
structuration theory has received substantial attention in the information systems field 
due to its rejection of traditional dualistic views of social phenomena as either determined 
by society (structure) or individuals (agency).  
This rejection of both positivism and strong interpretivism is seen in the IS 
literature as a rejection of both subjective and objective views of organizations 
(Orlikowski, 1992) and that of technological and social determinism (Jones and Karsten, 
2008). It was also seen as an opportunity to resolve inconsistent definitions of technology 
(i.e. technology scope), and those of the interaction between technology and 
organizations (i.e. technology role) (Orlikowski, 1992).  
Giddens attempted to reconcile the dichotomous perspectives of social systems 
(society vs. individual, structure vs. agency, objective vs. subjective) by focusing on the 
social processes or individual actions that are based on social structures, but at the same 
time serve to produce and reproduce social structures. The duality of structure or the 
dynamic conceptualization of structure as both a medium and an outcome of interaction 
is a central concept in Giddens‘ structuration theory.  
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Although technology is completely absent in structuration theory, its focus on 
structures and the dynamic processes by which humans use and modify structures 
through situated practice is of particular interest to IS researchers seeking to understand 
structures as properties of technology, work groups, and organizations and how an 
individual‘s use of technology is shaped by its features and yet reshapes them (Poole and 
DeSanctis, 1990, 1992, 1994).     
More than 330 IS papers have employed structuration concepts either to offer 
insight into IS phenomena, to explore its limitations in comparison to other theoretical 
perspectives, or as a source for developing IS-specific structuration theories that take 
technology into account (Jones and Karsten, 2008). Two IS variants of Giddens‘ 
structuration theory; the structuration model of technology (Orlikowski, 1992) and 
adaptive structuration theory (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994) were developed to facilitate 
investigation of the relationship between technology and organizations.     
The structuration model of technology is premised on a recursive notion of 
technology called the duality of technology; that technology is the outcome of human 
actions, yet is used by humans to accomplish some action and, thus, is both structurally 
and socially constructed (Orlikowski, 1992). In other words, technology in and of itself 
has no significance; it is only through ongoing appropriation by humans that it gains 
significance. In practice, technology use is conditioned by its material properties and built 
in structures. However, this conditioning is both enabling and constraining (Orlikowski, 
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1992) and although use is shaped by technology properties and structures, it also reshapes 
them causing new structures to emerge (Orlikowski, 2000). 
Therefore, technology design, use and interpretations are rather flexible. The 
degree to which a user can exercise influence over technology construction, either 
physically or socially, is termed ―the interpretive flexibility of technology‖ and it depends 
on the characteristics of the technology, human agents involved, and the institutional 
properties of organizations (Orlikowski, 1992).  
Organizations as well as technology users tend to ―black box‖ technologies over 
which they have no control. Orlikowski (1992) argued that researchers tend to view 
technology as either objective or subjective depending on the temporal stage the 
technology is currently at in the technology‘s lifecycle. For example, researchers 
studying the design of a technology recognize its dynamic and constructed nature and 
view it as a product of human action. On the other hand researchers investigating 
technology‘s use and impacts are more likely to view technology as a fixed object, 
ignoring the ongoing process of physical and social construction (Orlikowski, 1992).   
The time-space discontinuity between design and use of technology, which 
typically occurs at different organizations, is to blame for the conceptual dualism of 
technology dominating the IS literature (Orlikowski, 1992). However, the structuration 
model of technology posits that this disjuncture between design and use is artificial and 
assumes that technology is designed and used recursively where design and use stages are 
tightly coupled. In other words, technology is potentially modifiable through users‘ 
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ongoing interaction with it and, besides users‘ engagement in the initial design and 
development of technology, users can redesign technology at any point in time by means 
of the different ways they interpret, appropriate, and manipulate it (Orlikowski, 1992). 
Thus, understanding the technology-action relationship is critical in confronting 
structuration‘s central paradox of why technologies with identical structures cause 
different outcomes that lead to different effects on organizations (Orlikowski, 1992; 
DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). Adaptive structuration theory extends Giddens‘ structuration 
theory by considering the recursive relationship between technology and action, where 
technology social structures and the social structures that emerge in human actions 
iteratively shape each other.    
Technology social structures include features and capabilities provided by the 
technology and the ―spirit‖ or ―the general intent with regard to values and goal‖ of those 
features (DeSanctis and Poole 1994, p.126). Other sources of social structures that enable 
and constraint the appropriation process of technology are the nature of the tasks 
performed using the technology such as task complexity and interdependence and the 
organizational setting such as hierarchy, corporate information, and cultural beliefs.  
The two central processes in adaptive structuration theory are appropriations and 
structuration processes. Appropriations are ―the immediate, visible actions that evidence 
deeper structuration processes‖ (DeSanctis and Poole 1994, p.128). Structuration is the 
process by which social structures within technology, tasks, organizational environment 
or their outputs are produced and reproduced in social life (i.e. their rules and resources 
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are brought into action) which causes new social structures to emerge. The use and reuse 
of existing and new emergent social structures lead over time to their acceptance and 
institutionalization; bringing organizational change (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). 
Outcomes and changes brought about by technology use are contingent on many 
factors such as the organizational environment, the ―appropriation move‖ chosen by 
human agents, the faithfulness of their actions to the spirit and structural features of the 
technology, the reasons for bringing the technology or other structures into action, and 
their attitudes towards using the technology (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). 
Although adaptive structuration theory has been mainly applied to the study of 
group (decision) support systems (GDSS/GSS) and computer-mediated communications 
(CMC), it has established a legitimate link between main stream IS research and social 
theories in general and structuration in particular (Jones and Karsten, 2008). Thus, it can 
be applied to investigate the social processes involved in appropriating any class of 
advanced information technologies in organizations.  
Markets as IT Artifacts: A Structuration Perspective  
As defined above, information markets are technology-enabled information 
systems. Thus, from a structuration perspective, an information market can be defined in 
terms of its social structures: spirit and feature set. An information market is a consensus 
making system that provides information about the degree of convergence in its users‘ 
beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain future events. It seeks to measure, quantify and 
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consolidate its users‘ beliefs, as manifested by their trading behavior, in form of 
probabilities (i.e. trading price constrained between 0-100).  
 
Figure 9: Infographic for Information Markets Consensus Making Mechanism on 
Design and Use of IT Artifacts 
 
Traders express their beliefs in form of market transactions (e.g. buying and 
selling). Each transaction has two quantifiable properties: strength and direction. Strength 
is the amount of money offered, and direction is positive for bids (the event is likely to 
occur), or negative for asks (the event is unlikely to occur) (Figure 9-A). As positive 
transactions get stronger, or demand increases, contract price increases signaling a higher 
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degree of convergence in market users‘ beliefs about the likelihood of future events 
(Figure 9-B). Similarly, as negative transactions get stronger or supply increases, price 
decreases signaling a lower degree of convergence in market users‘ beliefs about the 
likelihood of future events (Figure 9-C). 
An information markets‘ surrounding environment and the context in which it 
operates shape the market objectives and its statement of purpose, also known as the 
technology ―spirit‖ (Figure 10). Organizations adopting the market should first and 
foremost create a mission statement and list of objectives for the market and accordingly 
develop instruments to measure market performance over time. Further, organizations 
should create an information sharing channel between market traders and executive 
management to share information about market performance, how its predictions are 
being used, and the benefits both gained and expected from its predictions. This will give 
the market a heightened sense of purpose and will consequently encourage market 
participation. 
Information Markets Design  
It is only after defining market objectives, setting forecasting goals, and 
formulating forecasting problems in form of questions that markets can be properly 
designed (Figure 10). The business environment imposes unique challenges on all aspects 
of information markets design; design of the market itself, design of market interfaces, 
and design of visualizations for market information. For example, markets designed for 
business forecasting might involve estimating sales figures for a range of different 
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products and, thus, the contracts used in those markets are more complex than those used 
in presidential election markets where outcomes are usually binary.   
 
Figure 10: A Structuration Model for Design and Use of Information  
Technology Artifacts 
 
Further, interest in using markets to aggregate information dispersed among a 
group of people came out of the desperate need for a mechanism that eliminates judgment 
biases and other social and informational influences that are commonly present in a group 
setting (Sunstein, 2005) to generate an honest consensus (Hanson, 1992). Markets have 
an inherent advantage over traditional information aggregation and group consensus 
making methods by offering incentives for true revelation of beliefs; market participants 
put their money where their mouths are.  
To utilize this valuable feature, an adopting organization must pay special 
attention to the design of the market‘s incentive structure. Unlike markets designed for 
predicting issues of public interest such as election outcomes or sports events, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Context 
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1 
2 
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organizational markets are usually thin with a relatively small number of trades and 
require a well designed incentives structure to attract traders and to motivate active 
participation and information gathering especially when information relevant to the 
forecasted events is not readily available, or easy to find.  
Other design elements of the market itself include: the trading mechanism, 
anonymity of traders, composition of initial traders portfolios, the use of real money or 
play money, duration of the market, trading hours, and whether participation is open or 
restricted to certain individuals. These design features of the market are shaped by the 
context of use and the market objectives. For example, gambling laws in certain states or 
countries might restrict the use of real money trading and depending on the questions 
asked in the market and the expected amount of participation, a trading mechanism that 
ensures liquidity (e.g. scoring rules) might be used instead of a one that does not (e.g. 
continuous double auction).  
The business environment and market objectives shape the design of market 
interfaces and the various visualizations used for market information in addition to 
shaping the design of the market itself. Similar to other information and communication 
technologies, information markets design effectiveness depends on its ability to satisfy 
users‘ needs and on users‘ ability to appropriately use it. Thus, we propose that the design 
of information markets, market interfaces, and visualizations be driven by three factors 
(Shown in Table 7): (1) Market users –Who; (2) Use motivation –Why; and (3) Market 
information –What. 
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Table 7: Guiding Aspects for Design of Information Markets 
Market Aspect Question to Ask Examples 
Market users Who is using the market? Employees, customers, 
partners decision makers 
Use 
motivation 
Why do users use the market? Focus on 
goals and motivations 
Entertainment, profit, inform 
decision 
Market 
information 
What information do users need to 
accomplish their goals/satisfy their needs? 
Trading volume, price trends, 
pending offers 
 
Market Users 
We propose a multidimensional framework for information markets users (Figure 
11) that classifies users according to three dimensions: 1) knowledge level in the issues 
being forecasted, as informed or uninformed users; 2) participation level in market 
trading, as active or passive users; and 3) externality level to the department/organization 
at which the market operates, as internal or external users.  
Informed users are those who are directly involved in the issues being forecasted 
or hold additional information to that which is publicly available about them. Uninformed 
users are those whose knowledge about the issues does not exceed what is publicly 
available. Active market users are those who submit one or more orders during a specific 
time window (e.g. hour, day, week), and passive users are market readers who do not 
submit any orders. While users might exhibit varying levels of knowledge or activity, the 
proposed framework focuses on the two main levels in each dimension to simplify 
discussion of users‘ motives and informational needs. Internal market users are the 
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department/organization‘s employees and external users are those who are not employed 
in the department/organization at which the market operates (e.g. customers, partners).        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: A Framework for Information Market Users 
 
Use Motivation  
Understanding what causes behavior and why that behavior varies in its intensity 
is the ultimate goal of motivation studies (Reeve, 2005). Although there are a wide 
variety of motivation theories, they generally focus on identifying sources of motivation 
and explaining their impacts on behavior (Reeve, 2005). According to affordance theory 
(Gibson, 1977), humans perception of the environment drives their behavior, as they 
perceive the properties of the objects surrounding them as ―affordances‖ that indicate 
possibilities for action. Affordance theory has contributed to our understanding of 
human-computer interaction processes and of what constitutes a good design. For 
example, good design makes the range of possible actions, or ways of interaction (i.e. 
affordances), visible and readily perceivable (Norman, 1999).  
Design theories inform design by emphasizing goals to be achieved and actions 
that might help achieve them (Malone, 1985). There are a number of theoretical 
  Participation Level 
  Active Passive Active Passive 
Knowledge 
Level 
Informed 1 3 5 7 
Uninformed  2 4 6 8 
  Internal External 
  Externality Level 
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perspectives for designing organizational interfaces, such as information processing, 
economic, political and motivational perspectives (Malone, 1985). Utilizing affordance 
theory of human perception as well as motivational theories of human behavior to 
understand technology use behavior, allows us to develop motivational design principles 
and eventually theories to guide the design of high ―motivational affordance‖ 
technologies (Zhang, 2008a). 
Information markets with high motivational affordances fulfill the motivational 
needs of market users. Each group of users in the framework proposed above (Figure 11) 
has its distinct motivational needs and goals that require different designs, information, or 
information visualizations to be fulfilled. Informed active users (Groups 1 and 5) are 
motivated by either extrinsic rewards such as money or prizes or by intrinsic rewards 
such as recognition. Uninformed active traders (Groups 2 and 6) are risk loving 
individuals who are mainly motivated by the thrill of the game and the entertaining 
aspects of betting on the future.  
In case of active users, market designs should continually meet users‘ 
expectations and fulfill their informational needs to at least sustain their activity level. 
However, the real design challenge comes in case of passive market users; because 
organizational information markets are usually thin and might suffer from illiquidity 
issues due to low activity levels. Thus, markets should be properly designed to turn 
passive users into active ones, attract as many traders as possible, and increase users‘ 
involvement and participation level. Special attention must be given to three types of 
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passive user as each type has different informational needs and can be influenced, 
targeted, or attracted by different aspects of market design:  
I. Internal and external informed users (Groups 3 and 7). 
II. Internal and external uninformed users (Groups 4 and 8). 
III. Internal informed and uninformed decisions makers (Groups 3 and 4). 
Type I users are interested market readers who do not participate in market 
trading mainly because they are risk-averse. Type I users are valuable because they hold 
information that can improve the accuracy of market forecasts and generate significant 
trading activity. They can be attracted by offering an anonymous trading option, a well 
designed incentive structure that, for example, allows them to cash out of the market at 
any point in time or by using play money instead of real money.  
Type II users are also risk-averse market readers who feel they do not have 
enough information to trade and read the market out of curiosity. Type II users are vital 
for information markets to work due to their role in executing informed trades. Since type 
II users are likely to be motivated by non-economic factors, finding ways to attract them 
is still an open question in the information markets literature (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2006).  
We propose a design-based solution to generate sufficient uninformed trades. 
Market designs should be intuitive, simple, and easy to use to attract uninformed trades. 
They should also be attractive to induce positive emotions that affect users‘ desire to use 
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the system (Norman, 2004) and, importantly, they should be perceived as fun, 
entertaining, and to some degree ―safe‖. Using play money instead of real money may 
decrease perceived riskiness of market trading and give it a fun game-like feeling. 
Malone (1982) argued that for interfaces to be enjoyable, they should provide 
performance feedback to users, be emotionally appealing, and capitalize on users‘ desire 
to have a well informed knowledge structure.   
Thus, enjoyable market interfaces should keep track of users‘ gains and losses and 
display relative and historical performance evaluation to traders. It should introduce new 
information when users feel their information is incomplete or inconsistent (Malone, 
1982) by displaying updates, announcements, or links to potential sources of information, 
such as meeting minutes and the department bulletin board. Motivating market interfaces 
also support social and psychological needs for relatedness (Zhang, 2008b) by providing 
the ability to communicate with other market traders through market chat rooms or 
market blogs.    
Type III users‘ knowledge level in the issues is irrelevant to market trading, as 
designers do not seek to turn them into active users. Type III users are decision makers 
who use the market for the sole purpose of informing their decisions and, thus, the 
designers‘ goal is to identify ways of making the market information more useful to 
managers.  Decision makers‘ focus is on the intelligence stored in the market and the 
collective intelligence produced by the market; how to turn it into business intelligence 
that gives their organization a competitive edge in the industry. Due to decision makers‘ 
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capacity in making intelligence actionable, special attention must be paid to the 
informational needs of decision makers to create managerial dashboards that provide 
them with greater control and visibility of what is going on in the market and allow them 
to act in a timely manner.   
Market Information  
There are an infinite number of ways of processing, aggregating, manipulating, 
and visualizing market information. Thus, there are an infinite number of ways of 
designing market interfaces. Although the design of markets, markets interfaces, and 
information visualizations can be guided by various theoretical perspectives, the optimal 
set of information or information visualization to display on a market interface can only 
be identified through the accumulation of empirical evidence.  
The main piece of information needed by market users is the price of the last 
traded contract in the outcome being forecasted. The last trade price represents the degree 
of convergence in users‘ beliefs about the likelihood of the outcome. It can also be 
interpreted as the outcome‘s probability of occurrence (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). 
Other price related information that can be useful to market users include: historical price 
trends, contract prices offered by other market traders, and the average, max, and min 
prices over a specified trading period.   
It is important to note, however, that price, and price-related information are noisy 
signals that might not aggregate and transfer all the available information in the market 
(Grossman and Stiglitz 1976; Noeth, Camerer, Plott, and Webber, 1999; Plott, 2000), 
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may suffer manipulation (Hansen, Schmidt and Strobel, 2004; Hanson, Oprea and Porter, 
2006; Rhode and Strumpf, 2006) and bubbles (Plott, 2000), and, thus might not, at some 
points in time, be an accurate representation of traders beliefs.  
Therefore, it is important to supplement prices with other non-price information, 
such as volume weighted price average and trading volume both in terms of money and 
number of shares, when making judgments about market conditions. Further, it is 
important to monitor the amount of trading activity regardless of the trading volume in a 
particular event because it signals the release of updates about its status and gives traders 
as well as decision makers an indication about the event‘s importance and degree of 
controversiality. 
Aside from trading information, announcing winners‘ names in each trading 
round provides timely and positive feedback that satisfies traders‘ cognitive motivational 
needs for competition, competence, achievement, and recognition (Malone 1985; Zhang, 
2008b). This also motivates other traders to gather information and engage in future 
trading. To satisfy social and psychological needs for relatedness and cooperation, market 
designs should facilitate human-human interaction (Malone 1985; Zhang, 2008b) by 
allowing traders to post comments and chat with other traders in the market.   
As for decision makers, additional market information can be utilized to allow for 
greater visibility of market activity. In an attempt to identify ways of making market 
information more useful to managers, Yassin (2009) proposed a novel decision heuristic 
for traders‘ beliefs about the likelihood of forecasted events that utilizes pending 
72 
 
transactions in the market. Pending transactions are valuable because they contain 
information that is not yet incorporated into market forecasts. 
The goal of forecasts is to enable managers to see ahead and take appropriate 
actions in advance. However, the accuracy of market forecasts cannot be judged until the 
market closing date or until the outcomes can be determined with certainty. Information 
that supplements market forecasts is important because it improves the quality of input to 
the decision process and allows managers to act in a timely manner.  
A managerial dashboard on the market allows managers to filter trading volume 
by departments or user group and to create traders‘ profiles and rank traders according to 
their activity level, money invested, historical performance, and other available data. 
Managers can use this capability to identify influential trades and information sources; 
thus, judging their credibility.   
Information Market Use 
An information market is embedded in conditions of its use and that, in turn, is 
embedded in an organizational environment. There is a recursive relationship between 
market design and use, between use and the market context of use, and between use and 
the market intended objectives (Figure 10), each shaping the other iteratively until new 
physical and social structures emerge. In other words, markets are designed purposefully 
according to a list of objectives which are created based on an analysis of users‘ needs. 
Markets are designed with a set of intended uses in mind. Use is shaped by current 
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organizational practices, communication channels, and hierarchy of control existing in 
the market‘s context of use.   
However, continued use of the market can uncover unattended needs and create 
new ones causing new technological features to be added to the market, thus, altering the 
design of the market interfaces and the information visualizations used. Continued use 
can also generate a wave of redistribution of power in adopting organizations where 
market participants at all levels in the organizational hierarchy contribute to the decision 
making process and, consequently, influence the decisions being made.  
Further, continued use can alter formal and informal reporting mechanism in the 
organization, create new communication channels, empower informal leaders, and form 
informal information generating and sharing groups of market participants. These factors 
may cause new social structures to emerge which over time become institutionalized 
structural properties of the organization. Also, market users might appropriate the market 
in unconventional ways through their different interpretations of market objectives and 
the different meanings they assign to it; creating unintended uses for the market which 
over time can become parts of the market objectives.  
Structuration Model of Technology-Induced Organization Development 
The dynamic interactions between organizations, market participants, and the 
market, as well as among participants themselves will keep redefining the market design 
objectives in a continuous cycle of define-design-use. Existing structures are used and 
reused causing new structures to emerge and these in turn will be used and reused until 
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change becomes an organizational habitual routine and the ability to adapt to change, or 
organizational changeability, becomes the only objectified and institutionalized 
organizational structural property (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Structuration Model of Technology-Induced Organization Development 
 
The structuration model of technology-induced organization development (Figure 
12) extends the two IS versions of Giddens‘ structuration theory: adaptive structuration 
theory (AST) (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994) and the structuration model of technology 
(Orlikowski, 1992) by moving beyond the traditional structuration process via a recursive 
relationship between technology and action. This model defines the relationship between 
technology and organizations to consider technology as a catalyst for organization change 
and development and the structuration cycle as a continuous change process that 
objectifies changeability as an organizational permanent structure that leads to the 
ultimate goal of the structuration process of IT artifacts: organization development (OD). 
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The structuration model of technology-induced organization development (Figure 
12) posits that:   
1. Effective structuration process of IT artifacts in organizations does not 
produce permanent structures.   
2. Existing and emerging physical and social structures involved in the 
structuration process of IT artifacts (including the technology ―spirit‖ or 
objectives) are temporary and potentially modifiable. 
3. Effective structuration process of IT artifacts in organizations produces 
habitual routines.  
4. Nurtured technology-induced habitual routines become over time reified and 
institutionalized organization structures.  
5. Reified organization structures lead to permanent structuration outcomes.   
6. The ultimate goal of the structuration process of IT artifacts in organizations is 
organization development.  
7. Technology-induced change should be nurtured as a habitual routine by 
organizations seeking development and growth.  
8. Nurtured habit of change causes organizational changeability to become 
institutionalized organization structure. 
9. Changeability leads to long lasting and continuous organizational 
development and growth. 
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Organization development is defined as ―an effort, planned, organization-wide, 
and managed from the top, to increase organization effectiveness and health through 
planned interventions in the organization's processes, using behavioral-science 
knowledge‖ (Beckhard 1969, p.9). Action research is used to carry out these behavioral 
interventions (French and Bell, 1990) through a cyclical change process of planning, 
action, and fact-finding (Lewin, 1946).   
Action research cycles of behavioral intervention and evaluation has moved 
traditional behavioral-science research from being reactive with respect to technology to 
being a proactive problem solving paradigm where IT artifacts, such as information 
markets, can be adopted and used as interventions to improve organization effectiveness 
and efficiency. However, it is important to note that although the decision to adopt and 
use an IT artifact as a solution is a behavioral intervention, the subsequent group of 
decisions regarding the technology‘s design, which features to use, and even the choice 
of which technology to adopt, is a design-science intervention.  
Design as a Group of Decisions 
Organizations faced with a problem can develop in-house solutions, buy custom 
made solutions developed by other organizations, or buy commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) IT artifacts. The effectiveness of the structuration process of IT artifacts (define-
design-use) depends in some part on how much influence the users have over the 
technology‘s design. Orlikowski (1992) argued that even if a technology was not 
developed in-house, users can still exercise influence over technology‘s design by means 
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of the different ways they interpret, appropriate, and manipulate it. We extend 
Orlikowski‘s argument by proposing that users can exercise influence over technology‘s 
design even before they have any interaction with it.      
Conceptualizing design as a group of decisions and the design process as a 
decision making process diminishes ―the time-space discontinuity‖ between design and 
use of IT artifacts in the sense that users can still choose among alternative solutions 
available in the market and between various configurations and settings provided by each 
solution. For example, organizations seeking to improve their sales forecasts can choose 
from a variety of information market solutions available in the marketplace without 
having to develop one in-house and yet retain a sufficient amount of control over their 
design to ensure an effective structuration process.  
Some market platforms allow users full control over their design by providing 
them the option to choose from a range of trading mechanisms, contract types, incentive 
structures, anonymity levels, trading hours, and many other market design features. Each 
group of settings constitutes a unique IT artifact design that can be evaluated using 
common design-science evaluation methods and the impacts of existing structures, such 
organization policies and culture, on the decision making process can be analyzed as a 
surrogate for the analysis of the design and development processes for in-house 
developed solutions. 
The structuration process of IT artifacts (Figure 12) combines both design science 
design-evaluate loops with proactive behavioral science adopt/use–evaluate loops to 
78 
 
create an occasion for an ongoing process of organization change and development. The 
traditional views on the structuration process of technology acknowledge the change 
caused by the technology-action relationship and its interaction with organizations 
(DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). However, this change is not planned but rather a natural 
result of situated practice and unless managed its effects on people, groups, and 
organizations are random and may or may not lead to organization development.  
The change resulting from the structuration process of IT artifacts (Figure 12) is 
planned in the sense that technology is designed or adopted as an intervention to induce 
change. However, the structuration process itself takes its own path and progresses in 
unplanned manner. For example, we do not instruct people how to appropriate the 
technology. But we do manage the process by first encouraging users to explore and 
experiment with the different ways of using the technology; second, by designing or 
choosing to adopt IT artifacts that are malleable and can be redesigned or modified as 
needed; and third, by creating flexible organizations rules and policies that give some 
degree of freedom to technology users to experiment allowing for change to eventually 
take place. It is important to note though that change is not the aspired for outcome but 
rather the planned continuous change that leads to organization development. 
Conclusions and Future Directions  
Conceptualizing information markets as an IT artifact using a structuration lens 
and placing it in a business environment as a system within a bigger system is an 
important first step towards building information systems theories about organizational 
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information markets to describe, explain, and predict their behavior and impacts on 
organizations. Attaining a better understanding of the design, implementation, and use 
processes of information markets in organizations is vital to devise design, 
implementation, and use guidelines and procedures that promote an effective 
structuration process that leads to organization development.  
Future research should investigate the structuration and appropriation processes of 
information markets in organization where markets are used as an intervention to induce 
organizational change and development. Future research should also characterize the 
decision making and cognitive processes involved in analyzing/using market information 
from both the trader and the decision maker perspectives, to design effective market 
interfaces that meets users‘ motivational and informational needs.  
Evaluations of market design‘s usefulness and efficacy in satisfying users‘ needs 
by cognitive walkthroughs, focus groups, surveys, or experiments will provide valuable 
feedback into the design and will add to our knowledge base by providing a better 
understanding of the design and use processes of markets inside the organization. It will 
also improve our understanding of the decision making and cognitive processes of 
various market users when analyzing market information. 
The design of information markets, market interfaces, and information 
visualization should fit the task at hand to accomplish market objectives. However, fit is 
moderated by traders and organizational factors. The accumulation of empirical evidence 
will provide guidance on how to design highly motivating information markets that 
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satisfy users‘ needs and will suggest the optimal feature set that best fits the problem at 
hand in order to result in desirable outcomes.  
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Chapter Four 
 Information Markets for Software Projects Risk Management 
Introduction 
Software projects are characterized by high failure rates. In 2006, 19 percent of 
initiated software projects in the US were outright failures; canceled before completion or 
not deployed. 46 percent of projects failed to meet user requirements, had cost overruns, 
or were not delivered according to schedule (Rubinstein, 2007). In 2007, an independent 
market research firm surveyed 800 IT managers across eight countries. The results 
demonstrated that failure rates are universal; 62 percent of IT projects failed to meet their 
schedules, 49 percent exceeded their budget, and 41 percent failed to deliver the expected 
business value and return on investment (Dynamic Markets Limited, 2007).  
One dominant reason leading to software project failures is management‘s 
inability to manage the risks in the early stages of the software development process 
(Boehm, 1991). Software project risk is an uncertain event that may have negative effects 
on the processes and/or outcomes of software projects, such as software quality, scope, 
costs and schedule (Project Management Institute, 2004). In order to guard against or 
mitigate the negative effects of the various risks facing software projects, management 
must first identify relevant risk factors, assess their likelihood of occurrence, and their 
potential impacts on project objectives (Boehm, 1991). A risk matrix can then be 
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constructed that assigns a risk score to each factor; which is the product of its likelihood 
and impact (Charette, 1989). 
Several approaches for assessing risk factors‘ probabilities and impacts on project 
objectives have been proposed, such as brainstorming, interviewing, the Delphi method, 
and scenario analysis (Project Management Institute, 2004). However, these methods 
require expert participation and are time and resource intensive. In addition, getting 
objective and accurate estimation of risk probability and impact at the beginning of 
software development projects is very difficult. Thus, recent research has proposed using 
fuzzy logic and software metrics to assess risks (Liu, Kane and Bambroo, 2006). 
Although software metrics, such as requirement volatility and cyclomatic complexity, can 
lead to more objective assessment of risks, they are difficult to measure and expensive to 
collect and update periodically particularly in small organizations with limited resources.   
Checklist analysis is another popular method for identifying risk factors that has 
received much attention in the literature due to its simplicity and low cost relative to 
other methods (Iversen, Mathiassen and Nielsen, 2004). Checklist analysis relies on 
historical data and knowledge of similar projects to create a list of potential risks and 
their likelihood of occurrence. Several lists of risk factors have been published in the 
software project management literature (Bohem and Ross, 1989; Barki, Rivard, and 
Talbot, 1993; Keil, Cule, Lyytinen, and Schmidt, 1998; Moynihan, 1996; Ropponen and 
Lyytinen, 2000). Other approaches such as risk-action list (Alter and Ginzberg, 1978; 
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Bohem, 1991; Jones, 1994), risk portfolio model (McFarlan, 1981), and requirements risk 
analysis (Davis, 1982) have also been popular among software development managers.  
Each approach has its limitations (Lyytinen, Mathiassen and Ropponen, 1998; 
Moynihan, 1997) and thus hybrid methods have been proposed to provide a more 
comprehensive, context-sensitive risk management approach (Lyytinen et al., 1998). 
However, tt is important to note that although current risk management approaches can 
be useful in identifying and prioritizing risks, assessing risks‘ probabilities and impacts, 
as well as in suggesting mitigation strategies, none of them addresses the fundamental 
problem behind software projects failure; communication.  
Further, the initial risk assessments provided by current approaches are ineffective 
in reducing software project chances of failure unless there are methods that continuously 
provide complete, current, and accurate information about the status of project objectives 
as events unfold. Otherwise managers are left with unrealistic, dated assessments of 
project risks, and as a result fail to take appropriate actions to mitigate them.  
Many large scale software disasters have been attributed to inaccurate status 
reporting, such as the case of the CONFIRM project (Oz, 1994). Reluctance to transmit 
bad news (Kiel, Smith, Pawlowski and Jin, 2004), status misperception, deliberate 
misrepresentation by software developers and project managers (Snow and Keil, 2002), 
and escalation of commitment; where resources are continued to be expended on software 
projects destined for failure (Keil, 1995), are some of the reasons that lead to inaccurate 
status reports, and consequently, inaccurate assessments of risks and eventually project 
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failure. These issues call for creative approaches to improve communication of project 
status information in order that senior management can terminate failing projects, salvage 
or redirect valuable resources in a timely manner.  
This chapter introduces information markets to the software project management 
domain as an approach to risk management. Markets may prove to be invaluable in 
minimizing software projects chances of failure. By aggregating status information from 
all levels of the organization and providing early warning signals about risks, markets can 
assume the difficult task of ―blowing the whistle‖ on challenged projects. We draw on the 
design science research paradigm (Hevner et al., 2004) to design an experimental 
information market solution for software project risk assessment. We evaluate the 
market‘s efficacy in solving the identified problems using two controlled experiments.  
This chapter is organized as follows: section two reviews the literature on 
software project risk assessment and discusses the challenges faced by software project 
managers that justify the need for the proposed information market approach. We then 
propose a theoretical framework along with propositions for the determinants of software 
project risks assessment accuracy.  
Section three introduces the research approach and research questions. Section 
four focuses on artifact design and addresses the first two research questions by 
proposing an information market solution and research hypotheses about its expected 
utility for software projects risk assessment. Section five describes two controlled 
experiments that used a role-playing scenario to evaluate the proposed information 
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market design and answer the design evaluation research questions. Section six describes 
data analysis, scale validation and results. A discussion of the findings and their 
implications for theory and practice are described next. This chapter ends with 
conclusions and future directions.      
Challenges to Software Projects Risk Assessment 
The dynamic nature of the software industry and the high volatility of software 
project requirements add complexity to the inherently complex task of risk assessment. 
The intangible nature of software and the lack of visible signs of progress make it hard 
for management to ascertain true project status or to uncover problems until the project is 
well over budget or has passed schedule deadlines (Zmud, 1980; Abdel-Hamid and 
Madnick, 1991).  
Further, traditional project management and control techniques for acquiring 
status information to assess project risks, such as meetings, surveys and status reports, 
have been proven to be ineffective at revealing risks. Abdel-Hamid, Sengupta and Ronan 
(1993) showed that project managers tend to anchor on initial perceptions of status that 
affects their decisions to re-adjust project plans down the road, even when the situation 
requires readjustment. Also, Snow and Keil (2002) showed that software project 
managers make significant errors in assessing status and may not faithfully report their 
true beliefs causing reported status to be very different from reality.    
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In many organizations valuable information that could potentially save millions of 
dollars is distributed at lower levels of the hierarchy and oftentimes fails to be 
communicated to project sponsors who have the power to change the direction of the 
project (Keil and Roby, 1999). Employees‘ reluctance to ―blow the whistle‖ is impacted 
by their sense of personal responsibility to report the bad news which is influenced by 
their perception of whether bad news ought to be reported or not (Dozier and Miceli, 
1985).   
Additional factors that were proven to impact employees‘ willingness to report 
true status information are organizational climate and information asymmetry (Keil et al., 
2004). Unhealthy organizational climate can produce the so-called ―mum effect‖ where 
employees refrain from reporting unpleasant information to management because they 
fear penalties of various sorts. Research has shown that in organizations where there is 
reluctance to either reporting and/or hearing negative information, silence will prevail 
even when an employee is an auditor or assumes a formal role of reporting problems 
(Keil and Robey, 2001).  
Organizational culture that does not encourage open communication creates an 
incentive to shirk issues and reduces employees‘ sense of responsibility to report bad 
news because the interests of employees are no longer aligned with the interests of the 
organization (Keil et al., 2004). Similarly, when perceived information asymmetry 
between management and employees is high and where individuals think that negative 
information can be hidden from management, they will be less likely to perceive negative 
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information as ought to be reported and eventually their reluctance to report it will 
increase (Keil et al., 2004).    
The central whistle blowing decision model (Dozier and Miceli, 1985; Smith, 
Keil and Depledge, 2001) assumes that reporting an observed organizational wrongdoing 
is a choice that is left to an individual judgment and depends on whether or not s/he 
perceives the wrongdoing as ought to be reported and so assumes the responsibility for 
reporting it. However, in software development projects, as in many organizations, 
reporting project status information is an obligation not a choice. And is generally part of 
employees‘ job responsibilities and formal role in the organization.    
In organizations where all information ought to be reported and each employee is 
personally responsible for reporting what s/he knows, factors that directly impact 
individuals reluctance  to report bad news become of central focus. Further, there are 
many other problems that lead to ineffective communication of project status information 
other than reluctance to report bad news, such as status misperception, individual biases, 
deliberate misrepresentation, reporting incomplete or dated status information, and 
organizational silence (Park and Keil, 2009). These problems contribute to inadequate 
assessment of software project risks that causes escalation of commitment to a failing 
course of action, also known as project ―runaways‖, costing organizations hundreds of 
billions of dollars every year.  
Thus, organizations are in desperate need for information gathering and sharing 
mechanisms that adjust for subjectivity in individual judgment, cancel individual biases 
88 
 
out, offer incentives for faithful revelation of status information, and are capable of 
rapidly moving project status information from those who have it to those who need it to 
assess risks and make decisions.  
Research Framework and Research Questions 
The project status report is a key element in the software project risk assessment 
process. Current studies have focused on the accuracy of reported status information and 
bad news reporting in the context of IT projects (Snow and Keil, 2001; Keil et al., 2004). 
However, accuracy is only one attribute of project status information. Little research 
attention has been given to factors that impact other attributes of information, and 
consequently the accuracy of risk assessment. For example, accurate information can be 
incomplete and does not reflect the whole picture, or not up-to-date and does not 
incorporate the latest development progress updates or problems.  
Thus, we propose a theoretical framework to explain the variance in accuracy of 
software projects risk assessment (Figure 13). We incorporate the factors identified in the 
literature that are proven to impact the accuracy of reported status in the proposed model. 
Table 8 summarizes the model propositions. There are three main factors that determine 
the accuracy of risk assessment: (1) currency of reported status information, (2) 
completeness of reported status information, and (3) accuracy of reported status 
information.  
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Figure 13: Theoretical Framework for the Determinants of Software Projects Risk 
Assessment Accuracy 
 
 
Table 8: Theoretical Framework Propositions 
Propositions 
P1: More current status information leads to higher accuracy of risk 
assessment 
P2: Higher accuracy of status information leads to higher accuracy of 
risk assessment 
P3: More complete status information leads to higher accuracy of risk 
assessment 
P4: Higher individual willingness to report bad news leads to higher 
accuracy of status information 
P5: Lower individual errors of perception of project status leads to 
higher accuracy of status information 
 
As currency, accuracy, and completeness of reported status information increases, 
the accuracy of risk assessment will also increase. The accuracy of status information 
depends on (1) individuals‘ willingness to report negative status information or ―bad 
news‖ and is positively correlated with it, and (2) individuals‘ errors of perception of true 
project status and is negatively correlated with it (Snow and Keil, 2001; Keil and Robey, 
2001; Kiel et al., 2004).  
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Based on the proposed framework (Figure 13) the greatest improvement in 
software risk management will come from tools that increase the accuracy of risk 
assessment by improving the currency, accuracy, and completeness of reported status 
information. Information accuracy can be improved by adjusting for individual errors in 
perception of the project true status due to having access to only partial knowledge about 
the project and by increasing individuals‘ willingness to report negative status 
information.   
Existing tools for identifying and assessing risks are only effective in reducing 
software projects‘ chances of failure if they are supplemented with a mechanism that (1) 
efficiently collects and combines information from around the organization to provide 
complete assessment about the status of different project objectives, such as scope, 
quality, cost and schedule, (2) responds to unfolding events by rapidly incorporating new 
information into the assessment to provide current and up-to-date assessment of risks, (3) 
adjusts for individual errors in perception of project status and risk assessment, and (4) 
motivates those who are involved in the project or have access to information about its 
progress to faithfully report status information.  
The design science paradigm (Hevner et al., 2004) is concerned with the design 
and evaluation of technological solutions, or IT artifacts, to fulfill an identified business 
need. Thus, we are utilizing the design science research paradigm to design an 
experimental Web-based information aggregation mechanism, known as an information 
market, to aid organizations and project managers in assessing software project risks 
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(Figure 14). Market design is informed by existing theories, methodologies, and 
empirical evidence in the information market and software project management 
literatures. The proposed market design and its expected utility in the area of software 
project risk assessment are evaluated using controlled experiments. Experimental results 
can be used to refine market design and will contribute back to our knowledge base.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Design Science Approach for Designing and Evaluating an Information 
Market Solution for Software Project Risk Assessment 
 
Following the design science research guidelines proposed by Hevner et al. 
(2004), and our proposed research approach (discussed in chapter 2) for designing and 
evaluating IT artifacts developed to fulfill an identified business need, our research 
questions are organized into two sets: IT artifact design and IT artifact design evaluation. 
IT Artifact Design 
RQ1: What is the design of the 
information market solution for 
software projects risk assessment? 
RQ2: What is the expected utility of the 
proposed information markets solution? 
           
IT Artifact Design Evaluation 
RQ3: What is the information market 
efficacy in providing hypothesized 
utility?   
 
Business Need 
Software Project Risk 
Assessment 
Knowledge Base 
Relevant literature 
Justify Inform 
Apply Add 
Evaluate Refine 
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IT artifact design research questions are: 
RQ1 - What is the design of an information market solution for 
software projects risk assessment?   
RQ2 - What is the expected utility of the designed information 
market for software projects risk assessment? 
IT artifact design evaluation research questions are: 
RQ3 - What is the efficacy of an information market in providing 
hypothesized utility for software projects risk assessment? 
Information Markets Design  
An information market is a form of futures markets where individuals trade 
contracts whose payoff depends on the outcomes of uncertain future event. According to 
rational expectations theory (Muth, 1961), individuals take all available information into 
account in forming expectations about future events. In strongly efficient markets (Fama, 
1970) prices of traded assets reflect all available information about future prospects of the 
asset. Since prospects are analogous to events, prices in efficient information markets 
reflect all available information about the likelihood of the events. 
Information markets utilize market efficiency and the information aggregation 
property of prices (Hayek, 1945) to harness the collective knowledge of participants 
about the likelihood of future events. Although information markets differ in many 
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respects, such as trading mechanism, payoff function, composition of initial portfolio, 
and incentive structure, they generally consist of one or more events for which you would 
like a reliable forecast.  
The standard contract in the market is the binary contract, aka winner-take-all. It 
costs a certain amount and pays off, for instance, $1 if and only if the event occurs and 
nothing otherwise. Traders buy and sell contracts of future events based on their beliefs 
in the events likelihood of occurrence. The higher the likelihood of the event the higher 
its contract price and vice versa. The result is a trading price that tracks the consensus 
opinion (Hanson, 1992) and can be interpreted as market-aggregated forecast of the event 
probability (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). For example, if a contract price is selling for 
$60 that means there is a 60% chance of the event happening.  
In addition to forecasting events probability, the type of contract used in the 
market and its payoff function can elicit the collective expectations of a range of different 
parameters such as the mean or median value of an outcome (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2004). For example, the price of index contract with payoff proportionate to the outcome 
represents the market mean expectation of the outcome and the price of a spread contract 
with even money bet represents the market‘s median expectation of the outcome. 
Experimental research on information aggregation suggest that markets can 
aggregate and disseminate information fairly well (Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990; Plott 
and Sunder, 1988) and many successful implementations of information markets 
demonstrate their ability to aggregate information and generate reasonably accurate 
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forecasts about a wide variety of events, such as presidential election outcomes (Forsythe, 
Nelson, Neumann, and Wright, 1992), project delivery dates (Ortner, 1997, 1998), 
product sales (Chen and Plott, 2002; Hopman, 2007), and movie box office returns 
(Spann and Skiera, 2003).  
We propose a Web-based information market solution to help organizations in 
assessing risks facing software development projects. Table 9 summarizes the major 
design decisions that organizations must consider before implementing an information 
market.  
Table 9: Information Markets Major Design Aspects 
Design Decisions 
Market forecasting goal 
Contract payoff function 
Trader composition of initial 
portfolios/endowment 
Incentive mechanism 
Trading mechanism 
Trading anonymity 
Trading synchronicity 
Trading duration 
 
Following a design science research approach, market design is refined iteratively 
based on evaluation results. So organizations can experiment with various design 
configurations, such as implementing different incentive structures, payoff functions, and 
trading durations, until a design that suits their needs and provides the expected utility is 
achieved.     
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In the project management literature, project failure has generally been associated 
with not meeting four main objectives; cost, time, quality and scope (Atkinson, 1999; 
Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; Project Management Institute, 2004; Shenhar, Levy and 
Dvir, 1997). Consequently, any factor that causes the project to go over one or more of its 
planned objectives is a risk that should be mitigated. The higher the number of unmet 
objectives, the higher the project overall riskiness level and its chances of failure. 
Information markets can be used to monitor the status of the software projects main 
objectives and the overall riskiness level of the project. 
The questions asked in the market are directly related to its forecasting goal and 
are designed to reveal the true status of the project, or in other words, its riskiness level. 
An information market for each project objective can be launched to predict how likely 
each objective is to go over its planned limit, and another information market can be used 
to predict the riskiness level of the project or how likely it is that one or more of its 
objectives are currently unmet. The more unmet objectives the higher the riskiness level 
of the project. Questions asked in the markets take into account the impact definition of 
risks on major project objectives and seek to assess the collective forecast of the 
likelihood of these risks. Figure 15 provides some examples of risk impact definitions on 
cost, time, scope and quality objectives. 
Organizations can choose to keep track of only high or medium impact risks on 
the four main project objectives. For example, an information market designed to monitor 
high impact risks on the status of a project cost objective will predict the likelihood of 20-
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40% cost increase. Another market designed to monitor medium impact risks on the 
status of the time objective will predict the likelihood of 5-10% time increase.  Same 
applies to scope and quality objectives.  
 
Project 
Objective 
Impact Scales of a Risk on Major Project Objectives 
Very low 
(0.05) 
Low 
(0.10) 
Medium 
(0.20) 
High 
(0.40) 
Very High 
(0.80) 
Cost Insignificant 
cost 
increase 
< 10% cost 
increase 
10-20% 
cost 
increase 
20-40% cost 
increase 
>40% cost 
increase 
Time Insignificant 
time 
increase 
<5% time 
increase 
5-10% time 
increase 
10-20% time 
increase 
>20% time 
increase 
Scope Scope 
decrease 
barely 
noticeable 
Minor areas 
of scope 
affected 
Major areas 
of scope 
affected 
Scope 
reduction 
unacceptable 
to sponsor 
Project end 
item is 
effectively 
useless 
Quality Quality 
degradation 
barely 
noticeable 
Only very 
demanding 
applications 
are affected 
Quality 
reduction 
requires 
sponsor 
approval 
Quality 
reduction 
unacceptable 
to sponsor 
Project end 
item is 
effectively 
useless 
Figure 15: Definition of Impact Scales for Four Project Objectives  
(from PMBOK® Guide) 
 
Market generated probabilities of high or medium impact risks on different 
project objectives can then be used to assess the status of objectives using a risk matrix 
setup with risk impact definitions numeric scales (Figure 16). Risk definitions and 
interpretations can vary from one organization or project to the other. For example, if the 
market generated probability of a high impact risk (0.40) (such as having 20% cost 
increase) reaches 50%, the cost objective is considered unmet and warrants immediate 
managerial attention.  
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Probability Risk Score 
0.90 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.36 0.72 
0.70 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.28 0.56 
0.50 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.40 
0.30 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.24 
0.10 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 
Impact  0.05 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.80 
  
 
Figure 16: Risk Matrix 
 
The forecasting goal of the proposed experimental information market (Table 10) 
is the project riskiness level. The status of the project main objectives can be used to 
make an assessment of the project overall riskiness level using a simple status reporting 
approach similar to the ―traffic light reporting‖ scale (Coulter, 1990; Snow and Keil, 
2001). For example, if all four main project objectives are currently met, the project is 
considered low risk or ―green‖. And if only two or three objectives are met to date, the 
project is considered medium risk or ―yellow‖, and if only one or none of the objectives 
is currently met, the project is considered high risk or ―red‖. 
Thus, there are three possible outcomes to the question asked in the market (High 
Risk, Medium Risk and Low Risk). The market implements winner takes all payoff 
function. So after the market closing date, market prices can be interpreted as outcomes 
probabilities, and when the project true status can be determined with certainty, each 
contract bought in the actual outcomes will pay off a $100 virtual dollar and all others 
will pay off nothing.  
Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
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The traders‘ initial portfolios consist of no shares in any of the outcomes and a 
sufficiently large amount of virtual money to guarantee liquidity and sustain trading 
activity as events unfold. Contracts are cashed out when the market closes, and incentives 
will be distributed depending on traders‘ net worth after subtracting the initial 
endowment.    
The trading mechanism used in the proposed market design is automated market 
maker (AMM). Automated market maker has several advantages over its widely used 
counterpart; continuous double auction (CDA) that makes it particularly suitable to use in 
organizational markets. Markets used in organizations tend to be thin with a relatively 
small number of traders which can cause liquidity problems that negatively impact 
market forecasts. Unlike CDA, AMM guarantees liquidity because it does not require 
matching sellers to buyers but instead it let traders buy and sell contracts directly from 
the market, and as a result, transfer some of the financial risk to the market institution.  
Web-based implementations of information markets are not restricted by location 
or time and thus allow for both synchronous and asynchronous trading. Asynchronous 
trading can be particularly useful for organizations because employees, developers, 
customers and other project stakeholders can participate in trading or have access to the 
market from anywhere and at anytime. Synchronous trading via the web in multiple 
sessions is chosen because design evaluation experiments are conducted in a controlled 
environment where experimental task requires all subjects to be in the same place at the 
same time to facilitate training and distribution of information. Further, synchronous 
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trading in a controlled environment allows us to simulate real events at a more expedited 
pace than what a field study would allow and yet be able to achieve the same desired 
effects.  
Table 10: Experimental Information Market Design for Software Project Risk 
Assessment 
Design Aspect Selected Experimental Design 
Forecasting goals Project riskiness level (Low, Medium or High) 
Payoff function Winner takes all ($100 if true, $0 if not) 
Composition of initial 
portfolios/endowment 
No shares; $10,000 virtual money 
Incentive mechanism Reward highest (Net worth - $10,000) 
Trading mechanism Automated market maker 
Trading anonymity Anonymous 
Trading synchronicity Synchronous 
Trading duration 8 rounds 3 minutes each 
 
 
Information Markets Expected Utility  
The second IT artifact design research question focuses on the expected utility of 
the proposed information market solution for software projects risk assessment. Since 
project status information is the main input used by project sponsors to assess risks facing 
software projects, an information market is expected to provide utility by improving the 
currency, accuracy, and completeness of reported status information that will in turn 
increase the accuracy of project risk assessment. 
The proposed information market is expected to improve the completeness of 
status information by aggregating information about project objectives from all 
individuals involved in the project or who have information or even intuition about 
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project progress, regardless of their formal role or level at the organizational hierarchy. 
Information markets disseminate gathered information in form of prices that can be 
interpreted as a status report or collective assessment of project risks. Thus, in a properly 
designed information market, price or market-generated risk assessment should be equal 
to the reported status or assessment of a hypothetical person who has access to all project 
information.  
H1: An information market’s reported assessment of project risks 
will approximate the reported assessment of a single person in 
possession of all the information.      
The information aggregation property of market prices provides a cost-effective 
alternative to existing methods of information gathering such as surveys, periodic status 
reports and meetings. Further, information markets are dynamic and responsive to 
changing circumstances. Prices in information markets prove to incorporate new 
information almost instantly (Forsythe et al., 1992) and, therefore, can improve the 
currency of aggregated status information and provide continuous and up-to-date 
assessment of risks. Thus, information market price is expected to quickly move up or 
down in response to new information and so provide up-to-date assessment of risks.  
Individuals often misperceive the true status of the project due to having partial 
information about its progress which biases their assessments of risks. The process of 
price formation and discovery provides a solution to the complex task of aggregating 
individual assessments of risks. Trading dynamics in a market setting cancel individual 
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biases and errors out, preventing them from impacting predictions (Forsythe et al., 1992; 
Forsythe, Rietz, and Ross, 1999; Oliven and Rietz, 2004) and therefore can improve the 
accuracy of aggregated status information.   
H2: An information market’s reported assessment of project risks 
will be more accurate than any individual reported assessment 
of project risk   
Thus, in an organization where disparate project status information is dispersed 
among many people, a well-designed information market can collect this information 
bringing about, in form of prices, a complete and up to date collective assessment of 
project risks purified from individual biases and errors.  
However, prior research has identified several factors that impact the accuracy of 
reported status information, such as deliberate misrepresentation of status information 
(Snow and Keil, 2002). Although a well designed aggregation mechanism, such as an 
information market, can adjust for individual errors caused by inaccurate perceptions of 
project progress, accounting for information misrepresentation, or individuals reluctance 
to report accurate information remains a challenging task.     
In the context of IT projects, research adopting the whistle blowing theoretical 
perspective (Dozier and Miceli, 1985) has identified situational, organizational and 
personal variables that directly or indirectly influence employees‘ willingness to report 
negative information. Those factors are useful in predicting communication effectiveness 
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in certain organizations as well as employees‘ inclination to accurately report status 
information. However, some situational factors such as project risk (Smith et al., 2001) 
and impact of information technology failure (Park, Keil and Kim, 2009), organizational 
factors such as organization climate (Keil et al., 2004), and personal factors such as 
individual morality, ethics, and willingness to communicate (Park et al., 2009) cannot be 
easily adjusted or controlled.  
Research that aims to identify factors that can be controlled is critical because it 
enables organizations to target these factors to improve communication effectiveness, and 
increase employees‘ willingness to accurately report status information regardless of 
current situational, personal, or organizational conditions. We propose three ―adjustable‖ 
factors that can be controlled by organizations seeking to improve communication and 
increase individual willingness to report accurate status information, and consequently 
increase the accuracy of project risk assessment (Figure 17). In the context of software 
project status reporting ―bad news‖ refers to negative status information. 
Organizational conditions and employees‘ fear of retribution contribute to the 
problem of information misrepresentation and individuals‘ unwillingness to report 
negative status information (Keil and Robey 1999, 2001). Keil et al. (2004) extended the 
basic whistle blowing model (Dozier and Miceli, 1985, Smith and Kiel, 2003; Smith et 
al., 2001) by adding two constructs derived from agency theory to explain individuals‘ 
reluctance to report bad news: organizational climate and information asymmetry. They 
found that when organizational climate is not conducive to openness about problems, 
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individuals have an incentive to shirk and their reluctance to report bad news will 
increase.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Conceptual Model: Willingness to Report Bad News 
 
Table 11: Conceptual Model Propositions 
Propositions 
P6: Higher perceived anonymity of reporting mechanism increases 
individual willingness to report bad news  
P7: Higher perceived self-interest in truthful reporting increases 
individual willingness to report bad news  
P8: Lower perceived information asymmetry between employees 
and management/clients increase individual willingness to report 
bad news  
 
According to agency theory, agents are risk averse and will avoid any encounters 
that might jeopardize their jobs (Harrell and Harrison, 1994). Establishing an 
organizational climate that promotes openness might provide a long term solution. 
However, it is not always possible and is certainly not an easy task. Thus we propose that 
higher perceived anonymity of communication mechanisms increases individual 
Perceived 
Anonymity  
Perceived 
Information  
Asymmetry  
P6 
P7 
P8 
+ 
+ 
- 
Individual 
Willingness to 
Report Bad News 
Perceived Self 
Interest  
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willingness to report negative status information regardless of the organizational climate 
(Table 11), and is a factor that can be easily adjusted or controlled by organizations.  
Anonymity is a complex and influential aspect of communications medium that 
has received much attention in the study of collaborative technologies and group support 
systems (GSS) (Valacich, Leonard, Dennis and Nunamaker, 1992). An evaluation of 54 
case and field studies of organizations using group support systems (GSS) technology to 
improve decision making, identified anonymity as a characteristic of successful GSS 
implementations (Fjermestad and Hiltz, 2001). 
Anonymity features of the communication medium improves the communication 
process, and the overall group satisfaction with the technology compared to face-to-face 
meetings where group members are identified (Fjermestad and Hiltz, 2001), broadens 
participation and encourages diversity of thought (Bikson, 1996), improves the 
effectiveness of the communication process (Dennis, Heminger, Nunamaker and Vogel, 
1990), and increases group meetings quality (Dennis, Tryan, Vogel and Nunamaker, 
1997). Thus, a reporting mechanism that shields employees‘ identities from being 
exposed will provide employees with a sense of security and consequently will increase 
the accuracy of their reports. 
Employees participating in an information market report status information 
through their market trades. The proposed information market design allows for 
anonymous trading, where participants post bids or asks and perform market transactions 
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using pseudo names. Thus, it is expected to increase their perceived anonymity of the 
market reporting mechanism (Figure 18).    
H3: An information market in which trading is anonymous will 
increase employees’ perception of reporting mechanism’s 
anonymity    
 
Figure 18: Research Model: Information Market Impact on 
 Willingness to Report Bad News 
 
Additionally, based on agency theory, employees are utility maximizers and seek 
their self-interest. So if employees feel that hiding information or remaining silent is in 
their best interest, they will shirk from reporting bad news. We propose that a higher 
perceived self-interest in reporting accurate information will increase employees‘ 
willingness to report bad news (Table 11). Thus organizations should focus on factors that 
directly impact employees‘ perception of their self-interest, and at the same time, can be 
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easily controlled. Incentives improve goal congruence between employees and 
organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore we propose that a communication 
mechanism that offers incentives to employees for revealing true status information will 
increase their perception of self-interest and as a result their willingness to report 
negative status information (Figure 17). An information market offers incentives for 
faithful trading since contracts payoff depends on the outcomes of the forecasted events. 
So if employees have negative information about project progress, it is in their best 
interest to trade based on this information because they will benefit when events 
eventually occur (Figure 18).         
H4: An information market that provides incentives for faithful 
revelation of information will increase employees’ perceived 
self interest in reporting true status information   
In addition to perceived anonymity and perceived self-interest, we propose that 
adjusting perceived information asymmetry between employees and management can 
increase employees‘ willingness to report accurate information (Figure 17). When 
perceived information asymmetry is high (ability to hide bad news is high) individuals‘ 
reluctance to report bad news will increase (Keil et al., 2004). We propose that a 
communication mechanism that reduces employees‘ perceptions of information 
asymmetry (by making them feel that they cannot hide negative information from 
management) will increase their willingness to report bad news (Table 11).  
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Monitoring projects‘ progress reduces privately-held information and employees‘ 
perception of information asymmetry. An organizational information market acts like a 
project monitoring tool that facilitates identification of risks early enough to mitigate 
them. Further, an information market encourages employees to seek their self-interest 
(because money is involved), so employees will soon realize that they are better off 
utilizing their information advantage by trading on what they know because if they do 
not, others will, and consequently the market will reveal this information to management 
or the client. In other words, an information market acts as a control mechanism and will 
decrease employees perceived information asymmetry between them and 
management/client (Figure 18). 
H5: An information market will reduce employees’ perceptions of 
information asymmetry between them and management/client   
Ineffective monitoring and failing to manage goal conflict, shirking, and 
privately-held information are among the primary reasons for software development 
projects failure (Mahaney and Lederer, 2003). Organizations can design communication 
mechanisms, such as information market, that allow for anonymous reporting, offer 
incentives, and act as a monitoring tool of the project that creates low perceived 
information asymmetry in the organization, to improve the accuracy of employees‘ 
reports by increasing their willingness to report negative information.     
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H6: An information market in which trading is anonymous and 
provides incentives for truthful revelation of information will 
increase employees’ willingness to report bad news 
Now we describe design evaluation research questions and the experiments 
conducted to evaluate the proposed information market design and to test hypotheses 
about its expected utility for software projects‘ risk assessment.     
Information Markets Design Evaluation  
Despite the empirical evidence on markets‘ ability to aggregate information, the 
details of the information aggregation and dissemination process are not yet fully 
understood (Plott and Sunder, 1982; 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990). And although 
the results of laboratory experiments on security markets are useful in informing 
information markets design, information aggregation tasks used in lab experiments lack 
realism and their results are difficult to interpret and generalize to business settings.  
The results of pilot studies in the field are encouraging by their demonstration of 
the feasibility of using information markets in organizations, but they do not provide 
sufficient levels of internal validity and control required to advance a rigorous theory of 
organizational information markets.  
There is a need for more controlled experimental studies on the use of information 
markets for business problems that use business-related tasks and scenarios. Such 
experimental studies are needed to advance the theory of organizational information 
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markets and to improve our understanding of their utility to organizations. Experiments 
should provide sufficient degree of control that allows us to draw conclusions about 
manipulation effects and causality which, in turn, will allow us to build theoretical 
models to explain and predict the impact of various information markets designs on key 
business-related dependent variables, and to explain and predict information markets 
performance in specific business settings.  
Experimental results are important to build a fundamental understanding of how 
information markets work, what are their expected impacts and benefits, and why they 
are expected to work well in some organizations but not as well in others. Such an 
understanding will allow organizations to better utilize information markets. Field studies 
can then be used to test developed theories and research models.  
Thus, to answer design evaluation research question we conducted a laboratory 
experiment using the proposed experimental information market (Table 10) to test the 
market efficacy in providing complete, current and accurate information about software 
project risks. We used Inkling prediction markets platform (www.inklingmarkets.com) to 
setup the proposed risk assessment market. Given the developed theoretical framework 
(Figure 13) and hypotheses outlined in the previous section, we developed preliminarily 
experimental materials that include a business case, five different information structures 
that include different software development progress updates, and five different versions 
of a software project risk assessment survey.  
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The surveys included a section in which the subjects were asked to provide 
comments and suggestions to improve the clarity and understandability of the case and 
the survey. Each survey included a different information structure, or in other words, 
different development progress updates that give information about the status of the four 
main project objectives (functionality, quality, cost and schedule). It also included four 
manipulation check questions that asked participants to evaluate whether each project 
objective is currently met or not. The manipulation check questions tested the participants 
understanding of the case and the progress updates. The preliminarily case and surveys 
were administered to a group of 25 graduate students and their responses, comments and 
suggestions were used to strengthen the manipulations and improve the clarity of the 
case.  
Seven doctoral students pilot tested the risk assessment experiment using the 
information market. The results were used to improve several design aspects of the 
experiment; including trading sessions duration, incentive structure, and the distributed 
experimental materials (progress updates). The reminder of the section describes final 
experiments and instruments.  
Information Market Experiment   
The final business scenario asked participants to play the role of a member of the 
design and development team in a large consulting firm that is developing a new 
reservation system for an association of hotels and car rental corporations (the client). 
The scenario and development updates are inspired by the events of a real software 
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development project; the CONFIRM project (Oz, 1994). The scenario described four 
main objectives for the development project in terms of functionality, performance, 
budget and schedule. It also described conditions under which these objectives are 
considered unmet. Appendix A shows the information markets experimental scenario. 
Five different information structures were created that include software 
development progress updates to help participants verify whether project objectives are 
currently met or not, and to help them assess the riskiness level of the project. Appendix 
B shows the information structures. Each information structure was manipulated to 
provide information about the status of two or more of project objectives (Table 12).  
Table 12: Experimental Information Structures 
Group N Information Advantage 
A 7 Functionality and schedule objectives are unmet 
B 8 Schedule and budget objectives are unmet 
C 11 Functionality and performance objectives are unmet 
D 6 Public information- All four project objectives are met  
E 10 Public information and groups A, B and C information 
advantage 
 
Information structures were created to simulate the case of a real software 
development project.  Groups A, B and C represent groups of people who have private 
information about different aspects of the project and thus have only partial knowledge 
about the project overall status. Group D represent those who are not directly involved in 
the project and have access only to information that is publicly available which does not 
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always reflect the true status. Group E represents the hypothetical person (that H1 refers 
to) who possesses all available information about the project.  
Five versions of the risk assessment survey were created and administered to a 
different group of participants. Each survey included the business scenario shown in 
appendix C, and one of the developed information structures that include the 
development progress updates (Table 12). The survey had four manipulation check 
questions that asked about the status of the four main objectives. It also included the risk 
assessment question that asked participants to assign a probability score to each of the 
three risk states outlined in Table 13 to describe the project riskiness level based on the 
information they have about the status of the project objectives. Participants were told 
that the sum of three probabilities should be equal to 1.  
 
Table 13: Risk Assessment Question 
Project Riskiness Level Probability% 
Low risk: All four objectives are met to date   
Medium risk: Two or three objectives are met to date   
High risk: One or no objectives are met to date   
Sum 100% 
 
The risk assessment survey question is identical to the question asked in the 
proposed experimental information market (Table 10). The market forecasting goal was 
to predict the riskiness level of the software project described in the same business case 
described above. Seven graduate students participated in market trading. Table 14 shows 
the market participants demographics. The experiment lasted 24 minutes. Development 
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progress updates were distributed in 6 of the 8 trading sessions. Each session lasted 
around 3 minutes. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups (Group D 
had one participant). Groups A, B C, and D received identical development progress 
updates to the updates provided to the participants who completed the surveys.  
Table 14: Market Participants Demographics 
Subjects Demographics 
 N Min Max Mean S.D. 
Age (Years) 5 22 38 27.6 6.23 
Work Experience (Years) 7 0 26 11.36 10.45 
Experience in Software 
Projects  (Years) 
7 0 14 3.14 4.95 
 N Male Female 
Gender (%) 7 86% 14% 
 
 
The true riskiness level of the project described in the experimental business case 
scenarios was ―high risk‖, where all project objectives are currently unmet. Each 
participant in the market had access to only partial knowledge about the true status of the 
project (Table 12) in addition to the predictions of four information markets each 
designed to monitor the status of one of the project‘s four main objectives (shown in 
Appendix C). Market participants were expected to use their private information and the 
information they learned from markets‘ predictions to trade in the risk assessment 
market. At the end of trading, the market was expected to aggregate the private 
information distributed to all participants to reveal the true status of the project. 
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 Publishing private information in form of market predictions allows participants 
to benefit from their information advantage and at the same time accounted for internal 
communication channels among them.  
In organizations, private information about the status of different project 
objectives becomes known to others as project due date approaches, or simply because 
employees choose to share it with others or report it to management. This practice of 
making private information public was proven not to detract from information markets 
effectiveness in aggregating private information. To the contrary, it was shown to 
outperform settings where private information is not disclosed or where all information is 
publicly available (Almenberg, Kittlitz, and Pfeiffer, 2009). Also this practice suggests 
the information market usefulness in organizations that foster transparency and 
encourages open communications about issues and problems.   
The goal of the experiment was to test H1 and H2 by (1) comparing the market 
generated assessment of project risk to the average assessment of group E who received 
all available information about the project, and (2) comparing the accuracy of market 
generated assessment of project risk to the accuracy of average assessment of groups A, 
B, C, and D.  
To test the market efficacy in increasing individuals‘ willingness to report bad 
news, and as a result improve the accuracy of their status reports, we administered a 
survey to a sample of 72 graduate and undergraduate business students enrolled in 
information systems classes in a large metropolitan university in the United States. Table 
115 
 
15 describes participants‘ demographics. Participants‘ work experience suggests that they 
are appropriate subjects for this type of experiment since the manipulations and treatment 
conditions are associated with organizational dynamics and decision making.     
Table 15: Subjects Demographics 
Subjects Demographics 
 N Min Max Mean S.D. 
Age (Years)  65 21 44 28.31 5.99 
Work Experience (Years)   71 0 26 8.46 7.04 
Experience in Software 
Projects  (Years)  
71 0 20 2.80 5.17 
 N Male Female 
Gender (%) 70 76% 24% 
 
The subjects were told that the survey is part of a study that examines business 
decision making, and that it consisted of two parts. The subjects were informed that the 
survey is anonymous and their participation is completely voluntary. The first part of the 
survey described a business scenario and asked the participants to play the role of a 
member of the design and development team in a consulting firm involved in the 
development of a transaction processing system for a department store (the client). The 
scenario described negative project status information that according to the signed 
agreement between the company and the client allows the client to break out of their 
contract with the company. Appendix D shows the survey experimental scenario.  
The scenario was manipulated to reflect conditions of high information 
asymmetry, low self-interest in reporting negative information, and non-anonymous 
reporting mechanism in the organization. For the condition of high information 
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asymmetry between the client and the organization, the subjects were informed that 
unless employees report negative status information, the client will not become aware of 
them until the project due date. For conditions of low self-interest in reporting negative 
information, the subjects were informed that employees are expected not to mention 
problems in their status reports because management shares them with the clients, and 
those who mention problems in their reports get in trouble. For the non-anonymous 
reporting condition, the subjects were informed that status reports must include the 
employee‘s name and signature.     
After reading the case, subjects were asked to express how strongly they agree or 
disagree with a series of manipulation check statements that measured their perceived 
information asymmetry, perceived self interest and perceived anonymity of reporting 
mechanism in the organization. Then they were asked to express how likely they would 
report the negative status information. The second part of the survey introduced 
additional information to the case. The subjects were told that the client decided to use an 
information market to track the development progress of its transaction processing 
system. 
Subjects were informed that information markets are known for their ability to 
quickly incorporate new updates and information to provide up-to-date assessment of the 
status of project objectives. This property is expected to bring negative status information 
to the client attention very quickly. Subjects were also informed that trading in the 
information market is anonymous, and all transactions, bids and asks are maintained by 
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an independent third party organization. Employees can report negative status 
information or system problems in an information market without being identified. The 
market offers incentives for true revelation of status information. So if employees are 
reporting honestly they will benefit financially. All profits will be directly deposited by 
the independent company into the employees‘ bank accounts to protect their identities. 
All individuals involved in the design and development of the system, or have any 
information about its progress, are participating in market trading. 
Subjects were then asked to respond to the same questions they answered in the 
first part to test the market impact on their perceived information asymmetry, perceived 
self-interest in reporting bad news, perceived anonymity of reporting mechanism in the 
organization, and their willingness to report bad news.   
The four constructs of interest were measured using multiple-item scales using 
pre-validated instruments wherever possible. Appendix E shows all measurement scales 
organized by construct. Perceived information asymmetry was measured using two likert 
scaled items developed and validated by Kiel et al. (2004). Items were reworded to fit the 
context of the scenario. Perceived self-interest was measured using three likert scaled 
items designed specifically for this study. Perceived anonymity was measured using two 
likert scaled items which were also designed specifically for this study. Willingness to 
report bad news was measured using a modified version of the three likert scaled items 
developed and validated by Kiel et al. (2004) and Park and Kiel (2009). 
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Data Analysis and Results  
Data analysis was performed in two phases. In the first phase, the reliability and 
construct validity of all measurement scales were tested using confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA). Confirmatory factor analysis was chosen over alternative statistical 
techniques such as exploratory factor analysis because a priori theory about the number 
of factors and the relationships between factors and indicator variables exists. Amos 18 
was used to perform the confirmatory factor analysis. Amos stands for ―Analysis of 
Moment Structures‖ and is a software tool distributed by SPSS Inc. All measured items 
were modeled as reflective indicators of their corresponding factors.   
Scale Validation  
Scale validity can be demonstrated through measures of convergent and discriminant 
validity. Fornell and Larcker (1981) recommended three measures to assess convergent 
validity. (1) Standardized item-to-factor loadings (  ) should exceed 0.70. However, 
item loadings of 0.5 or 0.6 may still be acceptable if other items have high loadings on 
the same factor (Chin, 1998). (2) Composite reliability for each construct should exceed 
0.80. However, reliability score of 0.70 indicates ―extensive‖ evidence of reliability 
(Bearden, Netemeyer and Mobley, 1993), and (3) average variance extracted (AVE) for 
each construct should exceed 0.50, meaning that 50% of variance of the indicators is 
accounted for by the construct.  
Composite reliability scores are calculated using the following formula (Chin 
1998, p.320) where  is the standardized loading of the item (i) on the factor. 
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Average variance extracted (AVE) scores are calculated using the following 
formula (Fornel and Larcker, 1981) where  is the standardized loading of the item (i) on 
the factor. 
 
As seen in Table 16 standardized item-to-construct loadings for all scale items 
exceeded 0.70 except for the first anonymity item which has a 0.56 loading. However, the 
second item within the same block has a very high loading of 1. In addition, the 
composite reliability for perceived anonymity construct is higher than 0.70 threshold 
value, and its average variance extracted is higher than the recommended value of 0.50. 
Therefore, the first anonymity item loading was deemed acceptable.  
 
Table 16: Item-to-Construct Standardized Loadings 
Construct Item Item 
Loading 
Perceived information 
asymmetry (IA) 
IA1 0.71 
IA2 0.92 
Perceived self-interest (SI) 
SI1 0.83 
SI2 0.78 
SI3 0.82 
Perceived anonymity(AN) 
AN1 0.56 
AN2 1.00 
Willingness to report bad 
news (WL) 
WL1 0.93 
WL2 0.80 
WL3 0.85 
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Composite reliability and Cronbach‘s alpha is used to measure constructs 
reliability or the internal consistency of each constructs items. The recommended 
threshold is 0.70 for Cronbach‘s alpha, and 0.80 for the composite reliability. However, a 
score of 0.70 or higher is sufficient to demonstrate extensive evidence of construct 
reliability. As shown in Table 17, all constructs have Cronbach‘s Alpha and composite 
reliability of 0.70 or higher, and the average variance extracted for all construct is higher 
than the recommended threshold of 0.50. Thus, all three conditions of convergent validity 
were met. 
Table 17: Constructs Reliability 
Construct Composite 
Reliability 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) 
Perceived information 
asymmetry (IA) 
0.80 0.79 0.68 
Perceived self-interest 
(SI) 
0.85 0.84 0.66 
Perceived anonymity 
(AN) 
0.78 0.70 0.66 
Willingness to report 
bad news (WL) 
0.90 0.90 0.74 
 
To assess the constructs discriminant validity, we used Fornell and Larcker (1981) 
recommendation that the average variance extracted for each construct exceeds the 
square of correlations between that construct and all other constructs. As shown in Table 
18, the highest square of correlations is 0.48 between perceived self-interest and 
willingness to report bad news and is lower than the lowest average variance extracted of 
0.66 for perceived self-interest. Thus, the recommended condition for discriminant 
validity was met.   
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Table 18: Discriminant Validity 
Construct Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) 
Squares of Correlations 
Between Constructs 
IA SI AN WL 
IA 0.68 -- 0.09 0.17 0.07 
SI 0.66 0.09 -- 0.07 0.48 
AN 0.66 0.17 0.07 -- 0.05 
WL 0.74 0.07 0.48 0.05 -- 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
The market generated assessment of the project riskiness level was (High Risk 
86.23%, Medium Risk 8.46% and Low Risk 5.30%). These probabilities are equal to the 
average price for the transactions posted in the last minute of trading in each of the three 
states. Figure 19  shows the price curves of the project three riskiness states for the entire 
duration of the experiment. Since ―high risk‖ is the true status of the project, the rest of 
the data analysis will focus on the market generated assessment of the ―high risk‖ state.  
 
 
Figure 19: Price Curves of the Project Riskiness States 
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All three risk states started with equal probabilities (33.33%) of being the actual 
state at the beginning of the experiment. The price curve fluctuated according to the 
development progress updates. The updates were manipulated in such a way as to test the 
market responsiveness to negative status information. At the beginning of the experiment 
all updates and market predictions indicated that the project is within planned objectives. 
Thus, ―low risk‖ probability started to increase. At the beginning of the third trading 
session, updates indicated that only two objectives are being met so ―medium risk‖ 
probability went up. Around minute 15 (beginning of trading session 6), updates started 
to show that other project objectives are going over their planned goals, and consequently 
the ―high risk‖ probability spiked when the updates confirmed that the project is currently 
well over its planned objectives until it reached a near certain probability.  
It is worth noting that trading slowed down during the second and fifth trading 
sessions where no updates were distributed to participants, and speeded back up in the 
following sessions where updates indicated a change in project status. This demonstrates 
the market responsiveness to updates and its ability to provide current information about 
project risks.         
To test H1, a t-test was conducted to compare the market generated assessment of 
the ―high risk‖ state probability (test value = 0.8623) to the mean assessment of 
participants in group E who received all available information about the project.  
123 
 
H1 Statistical Hypotheses 
H0: µE = Pm       H0: µE = 0.8623 
Ha: µE <> Pm    Ha: µE <> 0.8623 
 
We assume that the population from which all samples in the five groups are 
randomly drawn is normally distributed. Although the t-test is fairly robust against 
violation of normality assumption, we will not be able to test the assumption because of 
the relatively small sample size in each of the groups. Thus, we also report the results of 
the non-parametric equivalent to the t-test: one-sample Wilcoxon test (also known as 
Wilcoxon signed rank test) as a complementary test.  
The one-sample Wilcoxon test does not make any assumptions about the 
sampling distribution and is used to test whether the sample median is equal to a 
specified value or not.  Table 19 shows descriptive statistics of the five groups‘ 
assessment of the ―high risk‖ state probability.  
Table 19: Groups Assessment of High Risk Probability 
Groups N Mean 
(High Risk %) 
S.D. Median 
(High Risk %) 
Group A 7 0.2214 0.20587 0.2500 
Group B 8 0.0438 0.09039 0.0000 
Group C 11 0.2318 0.36351 0.0000 
Group D 6 0.0983 0.14148 0.0250 
Group E 10 0.9500 0.12693 1.0000 
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Given the sample data from Group E, the t observed value (2.185) was less than 
the critical value (2.262). Thus, we fail to reject the null at 5% significance level (p-value 
= 0.057). In other words, the results of the t-test failed to reveal a statistically reliable 
difference between the market assessment and the true mean assessment of project risk 
made by individuals in possession of all the information. The power of the t-test is 0.747 
indicating that given our sample data, the probability of detecting a mean significantly 
different from the market assessment given such a difference actually exists is reasonably 
high. Since no significant difference was detected in the t-test, the result is much more 
likely to be due to a zero difference (supporting H1) rather than to a Type II error.  
In addition, at 5% significant level, the results of Wilcoxon test have also failed to 
reveal a statistically reliable difference between the market assessment (test value = 
0.8623) and the true median assessment of project risk made by individuals in group E 
(p-value = 0.59). Thus, H1 was supported.   
To test H2, a series of t-tests were conducted to compare the accuracy of the 
market to the accuracy of the groups (A, B, C, and D) mean assessment of the project 
―high risk‖ state. 
H2 Statistical Hypotheses 
H0: µ(Ai) <= Am             H0: µ(Ai)  <= 0.0877     
Ha: µ(Ai) > Am              Ha: µ(Ai)  > 0.0877   
i = A, B, C or D 
 
 The accuracy of the groups and the market assessment equals the absolute 
difference between market/groups generated assessments of ―high risk‖ probability and 
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the mean assessment made by group E (Assuming PE = µE). Table 20 shows the market 
vs. groups risk assessment accuracy. 
Table 20: Market vs. Groups Risk Assessment Accuracy 
Groups A B C D E Market 
Mean Assessment 0 ≤ Pi ≤ 1 0.2214 0.0438 0.2318 0.0983 0.9500 0.8623 
Mean Accuracy Ai =|PE – Pi| 0.7286 0.9063 0.7182 0.8517  0.0877 
Median Assessment 0 ≤ Pi ≤ 1 0.2500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0250 1.0000 0.8623 
Median Accuracy Ai =|PE – Pi| 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 0.9750  0.1377 
 
Table 21 shows the results of the t-tests. The t critical values for all the groups are 
less than the observed t values, the P-values are less than 5% significance level, and the 
upper and lower bound of all confidence intervals are positive. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternative at 5% significance level. We conclude that the 
market assessment accuracy of the project actual riskiness level is greater than the true 
mean assessment accuracy of any group of individuals with only partial knowledge about 
the project.                       
Table 21: Groups Risk Assessment Accuracy T-Tests 
Test Value Information Market Accuracy = 0.0877 
 
t observed t critical df 
P-value 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Group A   8.207 1.943 6 .000 .63857 .4482 .8290 
Group B 25.543 1.894 7 .000 .81625 .7407 .8918 
Group C   5.732 1.812 10 .000 .62818 .3840 .8724 
Group D 13.187 2.015 5 .000 .76167 .6132 .9101 
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The one-sample Wilcoxon test results have also found sufficient evidence to 
reject the null at 5% significance level (Table 22) indicating that the market assessment 
accuracy of the project actual riskiness level is greater than the median assessment 
accuracy of any of the four groups (assuming that group E median assessment of risk is 
equal to true population median).    
Table 22: Groups Risk Assessment Accuracy Wilcoxon tests 
Test Value 
Information Market Accuracy = 0.1377 
 P-value 
Group A 0.018 
Group B 0.008 
Group C 0.003 
Group D 0.026 
 
Table 23 shows descriptive statistics of survey items. The mean values for the 
three manipulated variables (IA-High, SI-Low and AN-Low) in the first part of the 
survey indicate that manipulations were effective.  
Table 23: Scale Properties 
Construct Item N Min Max 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Traditional Market 
Perceived information 
asymmetry (IA) 
IA1 72 1 7 4.29 2.21 1.81 1.10 
IA2 72 1 7 4.43 2.13 2.17 1.20 
Perceived 
self-interest (SI) 
SI1 72 1 7 2.88 2.03 5.67 1.44 
SI2 72 1 7 2.38 1.60 5.28 1.58 
SI3 72 1 7 3.28 2.16 5.35 1.60 
Perceived 
anonymity(AN) 
AN1 72 1 7 1.85 1.12 5.43 1.69 
AN2 72 1 7 2.07 1.49 5.82 1.49 
Willingness to report 
bad news(WL) 
WL1 72 1 7 3.44 2.03 5.58 1.44 
WL2 72 1 7 3.18 1.86 5.44 1.50 
WL3 72 1 7 3.44 1.91 5.06 1.56 
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Also, the mean values for all the variables move in the expected direction from 
the first part of the survey where employees used traditional status reporting mechanisms 
to the second part of the survey where employees used the information market 
mechanism to report project status. Mean perceived information asymmetry is lower in 
the information market condition than in the traditional reporting condition. Perceived 
self-interest, perceived anonymity and willingness to report bad news are higher in the 
market condition than in the traditional condition.   
To test, H3, H4, H5 and H6, a series of paired t-tests were conducted. Our sample 
size (n=72) is large enough to assume that mean differences are normally distributed 
because for large samples (n > 30), the central limit theorem ensures the t-test robustness 
against violations of the normality assumption. Table 24 shows the results of the paired 
tests. Support of the hypotheses was determined by examining the sign of the mean 
difference, t-values and the p-values at 5% significance level.   
Statistical Hypotheses 
H3 H0: IA - MIA <= 0           
Ha: IA - MIA > 0  
           
H4 H0: MSI - SI <= 0           
Ha: MSI - SI > 0      
       
H5 H0: MAN - AN <= 0           
Ha: MAN - AN > 0     
        
H6 H0: MWL - WL <= 0  
Ha: MWL - WL > 0            
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For the first pair, the mean difference as well as the upper and lower bound of the 
confidence interval are positive. The t-value is positive as well and greater than the 
critical value at 5% significance level indicating that the mean perceived information 
asymmetry in the information market condition (MIA) is lower than the mean perceived 
information asymmetry in the traditional reporting condition (IA). Thus, H3 was 
supported. For pairs 2, 3, and 4, the mean difference is positive, the upper and lower 
bound of the confidence interval are positive, and the t-values are positive and greater 
than the critical value at 5% significance level indicating that the mean perceived self-
interest (MSI), mean perceived anonymity (MAN) and mean willingness to report bad 
news (MWL) in the market condition are greater than their corresponding means in the 
traditional condition. Thus, H4, H5 and H6 were supported.         
Table 24: Paired Samples Test 
 
 
 
Paired Differences 
tobs tcrt df 
P-value 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
 
S.D 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 IA - MIA 2.458 2.101 1.965 2.952 9.928 2.66 71 .000 
Pair 2 MSI – SI 2.822 2.077 2.334 3.310 11.528 2.66 71 .000 
Pair 3 MAN - AN 3.625 2.040 3.146 4.104 15.076 2.66 71 .000 
Pair 4 MWL - WL 2.005 2.137 1.502 2.507 7.959 2.66 71 .000 
 
Discussion and Implications 
The variance in risk assessment accuracy, according to the proposed theoretical 
framework, depends on the completeness, currency and accuracy of reported status 
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information where accuracy of status information depends in turn on individuals‘ 
misperceptions of project status and their willingness to report bad news.  Figure 20 
shows a summary of the framework propositions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Summary of Theoretical Framework Propositions 
 
The results of the experiment provide empirical evidence on information markets 
efficacy in improving risk assessment accuracy by aggregating information from all 
participants in the market to provide more complete and accurate assessment of risks than 
any individual group of participants. Table 25 provides a summary of the hypotheses, 
results and implications. The information market assessment approximated the mean 
assessment of individuals who have access to all available information about the project. 
Those individuals rarely exist in organizations. Otherwise, an information market, or any 
other information aggregation and reporting mechanism, will not be needed.  
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Table 25: Summary of Results 
 
As is the case with most software development projects, status information are 
distributed among all individuals involved in the project and does not exist in 
Hypothesis Result Implications 
H1: An information market‘s 
reported assessment of project 
risks will approximate the 
reported assessment of a single 
person in possession of all the 
information      
Supported  Demonstrates information markets 
efficacy in aggregating information 
about project status from all market 
participants to provide ―complete‖ 
assessment of project risk  
H2: An information market‘s 
reported assessment of project 
risks will be more accurate than 
any individual reported 
assessment of project risk   
Supported Demonstrates  information  markets 
efficacy in adjusting for individuals‘ 
misperceptions of project risk due to 
partial knowledge about project status 
and as a result improve risk 
assessment accuracy  
H3: An information market in 
which trading is anonymous will 
increase employees‘ perception 
of reporting mechanism‘s 
anonymity    
Supported Demonstrate the effects of  a major 
design aspect of information markets; 
anonymity of trades, on employees 
perceptions of the anonymity of the 
market as a reporting mechanism 
which in turn is  proposed to increase 
their willingness to report bad news   
H4: An information market that 
provides incentives for faithful 
revelation of information will 
increase employees‘ perceived 
self-interest in reporting true 
status information   
Supported Demonstrate the effects of  a major 
design aspect of information markets; 
incentive structure, on employees 
perceptions of self interest in truthful 
reporting of status information  which 
is  proposed to increase their 
willingness to report bad news   
H5: An information market will 
reduce employees‘ perceptions 
of information asymmetry 
between them and 
management/client   
Supported Demonstrate an additional benefit for  
information  markets; decrease 
employees perception of information 
asymmetry, or their ability to hide 
information from management or 
clients, which is  proposed to increase 
their willingness to report bad news   
H6: An information market in 
which trading is anonymous and 
provides incentives for truthful 
revelation of information will 
increase employees‘ willingness 
to report bad news 
Supported Demonstrate  information  markets 
efficacy in increasing individuals 
willingness to report negative status 
information and as a result  improve 
risk assessment accuracy 
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concentrated form. Management as well as the clients relies on traditional project 
management techniques such as status reports and periodic meetings to monitor the status 
of the project and to check on its progress. However, traditional monitoring and reporting 
techniques have proven ineffective time and time again due to employees misperceptions 
of true project status and their reluctance to report negative information.  
The results of the experiment prove that information markets can adjust for 
individuals‘ risk perception errors due to incomplete information about the true status of 
the project. Market assessment of project risk proved to be more accurate than any 
individual group of people with access to incomplete information about the project. 
Additionally, the results provide evidence on information markets efficacy in increasing 
individual willingness to report negative status information via the market, and 
consequently improving the accuracy of the market generated assessment of project risks.       
Information markets ability to increase individual willingness to report bad news 
can be attributed to major design features of information markets such as anonymity of 
trades and incentive structures. Markets offer anonymity and provide incentives for 
honest reporting. The results of the experiment showed a significant increase in 
individuals‘ perceived self-interest in reporting true status information and in their 
perceived anonymity of the market reporting mechanism.  
Further, an information market is proven to decrease employees‘ perception of 
information asymmetry, or in other words, their perceived ability to hide information 
from management/clients. Information markets efficiency in responding to updates and 
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their proven ability to collect all available information about an event are believed to be 
the driving reasons behind the observed significant decrease in individuals‘ perception of 
information asymmetry.   
These results have important theoretical and practical implications. At the 
conceptual level, the decreased information asymmetry suggest that regardless of 
information markets‘ predictive accuracy, their mere existence in the organization might 
have a psychological impact that levels the playing field between management or clients 
and employees. As a result an information market can also increase employees‘ 
willingness to report bad news via other more traditional reporting mechanisms, and 
consequently improve risk assessment accuracy.    
Perhaps information markets‘ indirect positive effects on transparency of 
communications might encourage some organizations to adopt them more than the 
market‘s actual assessment accuracy. Also, markets may prove to be invaluable in 
minimizing software projects‘ chances of failure particularly in organizations where 
reporting of negative status information are not encouraged. By providing early warning 
signals about risks, markets can assume the difficult task of ―blowing the whistle‖ on 
challenged projects. 
Limitations 
Although laboratory experiments provide high degrees of internal validity and 
control, they provide lower degrees of external validity compared to field studies. To 
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improve generalizability of the results, the experimental information aggregation task 
used in this study was based on a realistic business scenario. However, the scenario and 
the progress updates that were distributed to participants throughout the experiment were 
manipulated to achieve high degree of control over the information structure that will 
allow us to test the market efficacy in aggregating information, and to investigate its 
effect on the market assessment of risk.  
In organizations the actual distribution of information among employees might 
not be as clear, and there might be other context-specific or extraneous variables, such as 
internal communication sharing channels between market participants that affect the 
market generated assessment that have not been investigated or accounted for in this 
study.      
Additionally, the survey measured behavioral intentions rather than actual 
behavior, and was manipulated to measure employees‘ willingness to report negative 
status information under certain conditions. The focus on few variables allowed us to 
investigate the impact of certain market design features on participants‘ perceptions and 
consequently their behavioral decision to report negative information. The goal was to 
shed light on some important factors that can improve the accuracy of risk assessment by 
increasing employees‘ willingness to report bad news, and at the same time, can be 
controlled by organizations, such as anonymity and incentives. However, there might be 
other factors that can be controlled by organizations that we did not investigate here.  
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Control of treatment conditions provided high internal validity that allowed us to 
examine causal relationships by measuring the difference in participants‘ perceptions of 
information asymmetry, anonymity and self-interest caused by the information market 
treatment. Anonymous market trading proved to increase employees‘ perception of the 
anonymity of the reporting mechanism. However, in organizations, markets might not be 
perceived as anonymous reporting mechanisms even when trading is.  
Depending on the forecasting goal and the size of the organization, traders in the 
market might not feel that their identities are protected because of the specialized 
knowledge they have about the project. So if small number of employees has access to 
status information about a certain objective, their trades in the market might be identified 
even when their real names are not attached to their trades. Thus, caution must be taken 
when generalizing this result to some organizations because perception of anonymity 
might be moderated by the size of the organization and employees‘ job responsibilities. 
Having said that, the market can still improve their willingness to report negative 
information because of the incentives it offers for truthful reporting, and the market 
effects on their perceptions of information asymmetry. 
Contributions and Future Directions 
This research makes several contributions to the software project risk 
management literature. First, it develops a theoretical framework for the determinants of 
risk assessment accuracy. This framework broadens our perspective by focusing on 
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important but under-investigated attributes of information that directly impact the 
accuracy of risk assessment, such as information currency and completeness.  
Second, it proposes an innovative technology-based information market solution 
to risk assessment problems to improve the accuracy, currency and completeness of 
reported project status information and consequently the accuracy of risk assessment. 
Third, it evaluates the efficacy of the proposed solution by conducting two 
controlled experiments. The risk assessment experiment provides a closer look at 
information aggregation and dissemination in information markets by using a realistic 
information structure and business scenario.  
The results of the experiments highlight an additional benefit for information 
markets besides their anonymity and incentives, which is the ability to influence 
participants‘ perceptions of information asymmetry.  This effect can be very useful to 
organizations if utilized properly. The results also provide evidence to the market 
effectiveness in improving software risk assessment accuracy, by improving the currency, 
accuracy and completeness of reported status information, which will consequently 
reduce software projects chances of failure and save organizations billions of dollars. 
Fourth, this research develops and validates measures for several important 
constructs such as perceived self-interest in reporting bad news and perceived anonymity 
of reporting mechanism. It also re-validates modified versions of existing measures such 
as willingness to report bad news and perceived information asymmetry.   
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Finally, this research highlights the importance and impacts of three variables 
derived from agency theory on employees‘ willingness to report bad news. These 
variables are information asymmetry, self-interest and anonymity. The difference 
between our proposed conceptual model of willingness to report bad news (Figure 17) 
and existing models in the literature is that it focuses our attention on factors that not only 
impact willingness but also can be adjusted and controlled by organizations. The 
proposed information market solution is proven to decrease employees‘ perception of 
information asymmetry, and to increase their perception of the anonymity of the 
reporting mechanism and their perceived self-interest in reporting negative status 
information.    
Future research should investigate the impact of these three factors individually 
on individuals‘ willingness to report bad news. It should also seek to identify other 
factors that can be adjusted by organizations or influenced by the use of technology. 
Future research should investigate the impact of different information structures on 
market generated assessment of risk, and then test information market effectiveness in 
improving risk assessment accuracy in the field.    
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Chapter Five 
 Summary and Future Directions 
Information markets are a form of futures markets whose primary purpose is to 
aggregate disparate information which is expensive to collect using other commonly used 
methods. Participants in the market trade contracts that payoff depending on the 
outcomes of future event. Contract prices can be interpreted as a forecast of the event 
probability and can be used by organizations to support a wide variety of decisions. 
Despite the corporate world‘s enthusiasm for information markets, the 
relationship between markets and organizations has not been fully investigated yet. There 
are many open questions and unknowns when it comes to the design and use of markets 
in a business environment. Markets are fundamentally technology-enabled information 
systems designed to provide efficient and effective solutions to identified business 
problems, such as forecasting, information aggregation and decision making under 
uncertainty.    
Technology is limited to the hardware and the software components of the 
market, and the information system encompasses the design, development, 
implementation, and use processes of the market, as well as the dynamic interaction 
between the market, people, and its environment to accomplish a certain task. This 
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dissertation employs two theoretical perspectives to investigate the relationship between 
information markets as IT artifacts and their context of use.  
Systems thinking framework (Checkland, 1981) is employed to develop a systems 
theory of information markets to facilitate investigation of the relationships and 
interactions between markets as systems and their context of use. An information market 
is viewed as a subsystem of the organization system in which it is used. The organization 
in turn operates within an industry, all of which operates in the largest system of all: the 
world.  
An information market encapsulates the aggregation system and its emergent 
properties or the ―intelligence‖ stored in the market, along with the market incentives and 
contracts structures, and produces an emergent property that makes the market larger than 
the sum of its parts; collective intelligence in form of equilibrium price. Each system 
engages in a process of cybernetic information exchange with its environment and has its 
own ways of responding to and communicating with the system in which it operates, as 
well as with other systems. A systems theory of information markets allow us to choose 
design and use processes that result in better long term benefits to organizations in light 
of existing interactions and interrelationships between the market and its subsystems, 
such as the aggregation mechanism and the incentives structure, and the bigger system(s) 
in which it operates, such as the organization and its various departments and the 
industry.   
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The second theoretical perspective is structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984). 
This research proposes a structuration model for design and use of IT artifacts in 
organizations and applies it to the study of information markets. The context in which the 
market operates shapes the market objectives and all aspects of market design. There is a 
recursive relationship between market objectives, design, use and context of use, each 
shaping the other iteratively.     
Just like any other information and communication technology, market success 
depends on users‘ abilities to effectively use it, and on the market‘s abilities to satisfy 
users‘ needs. The business environment imposes unique challenges on the market design. 
Thus, we propose that the design of information markets, market interfaces, and 
visualizations be driven by three factors: (1) Market users –Who; (2) Use motivation –
Why; and (3) Market information –What.   
This dissertation develops a multidimensional framework of market users to guide 
market design to satisfy users‘ motivational and informational needs.  The framework 
classifies users according to three dimensions: 1) knowledge level in the issues being 
forecasted, as informed or uninformed users; 2) participation level in market trading, as 
active or passive users; and 3) externality level to the department/organization at which 
the market operates, as internal or external users.  
Each group of market users has its own motivational needs and goals that can be 
satisfied using different information and market designs. Thus, information markets, 
market interfaces, and information visualizations can be designed specifically to target 
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and attract any group of users depending on careful analysis of their motivations and 
needs.  Thus, uninformed traders who are needed for markets to function properly can be 
attracted using markets designs that are intuitive, enjoyable, induce positive emotions that 
affect users‘ desire to use the system, and most importantly, they should be perceived as 
fun, entertaining, and to some degree ―safe‖. 
This research extends Giddens‘ structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984), 
adaptive structuration theory (AST) (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994), and the structuration 
model of technology (Orlikowski, 1992), by moving beyond the traditional structuration 
process and the recursive relationship between technology and action that defines the 
relationship between technology and organizations, to consider technology as a catalyst 
for organization change and development. The structuration cycle is viewed as a 
continuous change process that objectifies changeability as an organizational permanent 
structure that leads to the ultimate goal of the structuration process of IT artifacts: 
organization development (OD).  
A well-designed information market can generate several benefits to 
organizations which contribute to their growth and development. Software development 
organizations are in desperate need of better risk management tools due to their role in 
reducing software project chances of failure. This dissertation develops a theoretical 
framework for the determinants of software project risk assessment accuracy and 
proposes an information market design solution to help organizations better assess 
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software project risks. It evaluates the information market efficacy in increasing risk 
assessment accuracy using two controlled experiments.   
The first experiment compares the market generated assessment of risk for a given 
software project to the mean assessment of a group of individuals with access to all 
available information about the project. The results showed that the market assessment of 
risks approximated the mean assessment of the group demonstrating the market efficacy 
in aggregating available information about the project from all market participants to 
provide an assessment based on ―complete‖ information about the project status which 
leads to higher accuracy of risk assessment.  
It also compares the market generated assessment of risk to the mean assessment 
of four groups of individuals each of whom has access to partial information about the 
project status. The results showed that the market assessment of risk is more accurate 
than the assessment generated by any of the groups demonstrating the market efficacy in 
adjusting for individuals‘ errors of perception of project risk due to their incomplete 
information about its status.  
The second experiment focuses on three factors derived from agency theory that 
can be ―controlled‖ by organizations or influenced by the use of technology and are 
proposed to impact individuals‘ willingness to report negative status information, and as 
a result, the accuracy of reported status and risk assessment. These factors are 
information asymmetry between employees and management/clients, anonymity of the 
reporting mechanism, and self-interest in truthful reporting.  
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The results of the experiment demonstrated the effectiveness of major design 
features of information markets, such as the incentive structure and anonymity of trades, 
in influencing participants‘ perceptions of (1) information asymmetry between them and 
management/clients, (2) market anonymity as a reporting mechanism, and (3) self-
interest in truthful reporting. The results also demonstrated the market efficacy in 
increasing participants‘ willingness to report negative status information, and as a result 
increasing the accuracy of reported status and risk assessment. 
Future research should investigate the impact of these three factors idependently 
on an individual‘s willingness to report bad news. It should also seek to identify other 
factors that can be adjusted by organizations or influenced by the use of technology.  
Future research should investigate the impact of different contracts, incentive 
structures and market mechanisms such as pari-mutuel, continuous double auction, and 
market scoring rules on the market‘s assessment accuracy. It should also investigate the 
impact of different information structures on market generated assessments of risk, and 
then test information market effectiveness in improving risk assessment accuracy in the 
field.    
This dissertation suggests other fruitful areas of research. There is a great need for 
studies that empirically compare information markets to other methods of information 
aggregation, such as the Delphi method, not only in terms of forecasting accuracy but 
also on multiple other dimensions, such as the nature of the forecasting problems 
appropriate for each method, sources of relevant information (e.g. external, internal, or a 
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mix of both), the availability of public information to attract participants, the availability 
of experts in certain areas, and the costs involved in recruiting experts, acquiring the 
market, training, trading time and incentives. 
Further, there is a need for studies that investigate the structuration and 
appropriation processes of information markets in organization where markets are used as 
an intervention to induce organizational change and development. Additionally, there is a 
need for research that seeks to characterize the decision making and cognitive processes 
involved in analyzing and using market information, from both the trader and the 
decision maker perspectives. Research is also needed on the design of effective market 
interfaces that meet users‘ motivational and informational needs.  
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Appendix A: Information Markets Experimental Scenario 
Innovations & More Corporation (IMC) 
Information Markets for Software Project Risk Management 
 
You are a member of the design and development team in a large consulting firm; 
Innovations & More Corporation (IMC). Your firm is developing a new reservation 
system for an association of hotels and car rental corporations (the client). Your firm and 
the client signed an agreement describing the four main objectives for the development 
project in terms of functionality, performance, budget and schedule. It also describes 
conditions under which these objectives are considered unmet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Objective 
Objective is considered 
UNMET if 
Functionality  Integrate airline, rental 
car and hotel information 
in a central database. 
System fails integration test  
Performance Transaction response time 
is 1 second 
Transaction response time 
exceeds 2 seconds 
Budget $55 million  Cost exceeds budget by 10% 
($5.5 million) 
Schedule Design phase: 12 months 
(1 year)  
Development phase: 48 
months (4 years) 
Schedule exceeds deadline 
by 15% (9 months)   
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Appendix A: (Continued) 
Your firm and the client agreed to set up 5 information markets to track the 
development progress of the reservation system. One market is created to monitor the 
status of each project objective (total of 4 markets), and the fifth market to monitor the 
project overall status (riskiness level). The project riskiness level depends on whether 
project objectives are met or not: 
 Low risk: All four objectives substantially met to date 
 Medium risk: Two or three objectives substantially met to date  
 High risk: One or zero objectives substantially met to date  
 
Market Forecasting Goal Price (%) 
1 
Will the project meet its functionality objective? 
i.e. System pass integration test 
Yes 50% 
No 50% 
Sum 100% 
2 
Will the project meet its performance objective? 
i.e. Transaction response time is less than 2 seconds 
Yes 50% 
No 50% 
Sum 100% 
3 
Will the project meet its budget objective? 
i.e. Budget increase is less than 10% 
Yes 50% 
No 50% 
Sum 100% 
4 
Will the project meet its schedule objective? 
i.e. Schedule increase is less than 15% 
Yes 50% 
No 50% 
Sum  100% 
Market Forecasting Goal 
5 
Which state best describes the project riskiness level? Price (%) 
Low risk: All four objectives substantially met to date 33.3% 
Medium risk: Two or three objectives substantially met to date  33.3% 
High risk: One or zero objectives substantially met to date 33.3% 
Sum  100% 
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Appendix A: (Continued) 
You will be provided with development progress updates to help you verify 
whether project objectives are currently met or not. Progress updates provide information 
to help you better assess the riskiness level of the project. You will also be provided with 
the predictions of the four information markets that monitor the status of the project 
objectives. Based on progress updates and the market predictions provided to you, you 
will participate in an information market designed to predict the riskiness level of the 
project.   
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Appendix B: Information Structures 
GROUP A 
Update 0 - The project is going great. Currently there is no reason to believe that the 
project will not meet any of its objectives.  
Update1 - 4 months after signing the agreement, base design is completed and presented 
to the client. Base design describes expected functionality in general terms, and does not 
provide sufficient details for developers to understand what the user is expecting.  
Update2 - 1 year after signing the agreement, the design phase is completed. However, 
the quality of the specification is questionable, and might cause serious delays down the 
road.  
Update3 - IMC circulated a preliminary development plan. The client requested some 
revisions. 
Update4 - Development plan was revised and sent to the client. Revisions to 
development plan were unexpected and delayed the project by at least 10 months 
(resulting in more than 15% schedule overrun).  
Update5 - IMC admits some technical difficulties, and that the system failed integration 
tests.  
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Appendix B: (Continued) 
 
GROUP B 
Update 0 - The project is going great. Currently there is no reason to believe that the 
project will not meet any of its objectives.  
Update1 - 4 months after signing the agreement, base design is completed and presented 
to the client.  
Update2 - 1 year after signing the agreement, the design phase is completed. However, 
the quality of the specification is questionable, and might cause serious delays down the 
road. IMC circulated a preliminary development plan. The client requested some 
revisions. 
Update3 - Development plan was revised and sent to the client.  
Update4 - Revisions to development plan were unexpected and delayed the project by at 
least 10 months (resulting in more than 15% schedule overrun). 
Update5 - IMC guaranteed that the project will deliver expected functionality and 
performance. However, the firm hired some experts to help with technical problems. This 
increased the budget by at least 15%. 
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Appendix B: (Continued) 
GROUP C 
Update 0 - The project is going great. Currently there is no reason to believe that the 
project will not meet any of its objectives.  
Update1 - 4 months after signing the agreement, base design is completed and presented 
to the client.  
Update2 - 1 year after signing the agreement, the design phase is completed. However, 
the quality of the specifications is questionable. IMC circulated a preliminary 
development plan. The client requested some revisions. 
Update3 - The requested modifications to the development plan increased transaction 
response time to more than 2.0 seconds.  
Update4 - Development plan modifications did not affect the project budget or schedule.   
Update5 -The technical team found that the airline, rental car and hotel databases cannot 
be integrated. A major functionality cannot possibly be delivered.  
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Appendix B: (Continued) 
GROUP D (PUBLIC INFORMATION) 
Update 0 - The project is going great. Currently there is no reason to believe that the 
project will not meet any of its objectives.  
Update1 - 4 months after signing the agreement, base design is completed and presented 
to the client. Your firm (IMC) guaranteed the client that the final specifications will 
provide all necessary details to meet users‘ needs, and the design phase will be completed 
on time.      
Update2 - 1 year after signing the agreement, the design phase is completed on time. 
IMC circulated a preliminary development plan. Client requested some revisions.  
Update3 - 6 months later, development plan is revised and sent to the client.  
Update4 - IMC guaranteed that the project will still be delivered on time and with 
promised functionality.  
Update 5 - Two months later, IMC admits some technical difficulties, but is confident 
that it will deliver the project within budget and with expected performance.   
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Appendix B: (Continued) 
INFORMATION MARKET PREDICTIONS 
 
  Updates 
Market Outcomes 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
Yes 65% 55% 45% 40% 40% 5% 
No  35% 45% 55% 60% 60% 95% 
2 
Yes 65% 70% 70% 60% 25% 1% 
No 35% 30% 30% 40% 75% 99% 
3 
Yes 65% 65% 70% 65% 40% 5% 
No 35% 35% 30% 35% 60% 95% 
4 
Yes 65% 65% 50% 45% 25% 1% 
No 35% 35% 50% 55% 75% 99% 
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Appendix C: Risk Assessment Survey  
Innovations & More Corporation 
Business Case and Risk Assessment Survey 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: The following business case is part of a study that examines 
software project risk assessment. The case describes four main objectives for a software 
development project in terms of functionality, performance, budget and schedule. It also 
describes conditions under which these objectives are considered unmet. You will be 
provided with development progress updates to help you verify whether project 
objectives are currently met or not. Progress updates provide information to help you 
better assess the riskiness level of the project.    
Please read the following case and development progress updates and complete 
the survey that follows. 
Innovations & More Corporation (IMC) 
You are a member of the design and development team in a large consulting firm; 
Innovations & More Corporation (IMC). Your firm is developing a new reservation 
system for an association of hotels and car rental corporations (the client). Your firm and 
the client signed an agreement describing the four main objectives for the development 
project. 
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Appendix C: (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk Assessment Survey 
 
Based on all the information and updates provided to you Yes/No 
Does the project currently meet its functionality objective?  
Does the project currently meet its performance objective?  
Does the project currently meet its budget objective?   
Does the project currently meet its schedule objective?   
 
The client asked your firm to conduct a survey to assess the overall riskiness level of the 
project using discrete reporting scale (high risk, medium risk and low risk). Riskiness 
level is defined in terms of the number of unmet objectives. When all project objectives 
are met to date the project is considered low risk. When only two or three objectives are 
met to date, the project is considered medium risk. When one or no objectives are met, 
the project is considered high risk. 
 
Project Objective 
Objective is considered 
UNMET if 
Functionality  Integrate airline, rental 
car and hotel information 
in a central database. 
System fails integration test  
Performance Transaction response time 
is 1 second 
Transaction response time 
exceeds 2 seconds 
Budget $55 million  Cost exceeds budget by 10% 
($5.5 million) 
Schedule Design phase: 12 months 
(1 year)  
Development phase: 48 
months (4 years) 
Schedule exceeds deadline 
by 15% (9 months)   
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Appendix C: (Continued) 
Depending on the information you have about project status, assign a probability 
score to the state that best describes the project riskiness level. In other words, how likely 
the project is to achieve its objectives? For example, if your information indicates that all 
four project objectives are met to date, you will assign a 100% to low risk, 0% to medium 
risk, and 0% to high risk.  
 
Project Riskiness Level Probability% 
Low risk: All four objectives are met to date   
Medium risk: Two or three objectives are met to date  
High risk: One or no objectives are met to date   
Sum 100% 
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Appendix D: Survey Experimental Scenario  
INSTRUCTIONS: This business case is part of a study that examines business 
decision making. Please read the following case and answer the questions that follow 
based on the information presented in the case. 
 
Digit Dash & Beyond Corporation 
 
You are a member of the design and development team in a major consulting 
firm; Digit Dash & Beyond Corporation (DDB). For the last year you have been involved 
in the development of a transaction processing system for a large department store; 
Chars.com. DDB and Chars signed an agreement stating project objectives in terms of 
expected system‘s functionality, performance, estimated budget and schedule. The 
agreement also stated that the client can withdraw when two or more objectives are 
unmet during the first year of system development. The system has been under 
development for almost a year. The project is over budget, over schedule, system has 
performance issues and initial integration tests showed that the system will fail to deliver 
expected functionality. In other words, the project four main objectives are currently 
unmet.  
Unless employees report the status of project objectives, the client will not 
become aware of these issues until the project due date. Your firm has an implicit policy 
of not reporting negative status information to clients to keep them from withdrawing, 
and instead tries to arrange new agreement with the client before the project due date. 
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Appendix D: (Continued) 
Employees are required to submit a periodic status report to management. Management 
shares these reports with the client. The report must include the employee’s name and 
signature. Employees are expected not to mention problems in their status reports 
because clients will see them. Employees who mention problems in their reports get in 
trouble. In the past an employee reported performance issues in his formal report and got 
reprimanded by the project manager. Later he was denied a promotion, and lost his job. 
Rumor has it that his negative status report is behind it. 
NOTE: The above scenario represents the treatment used to manipulate high 
information asymmetry, high anonymity and low self-interest in reporting negative 
information. The scenario that follows was used in the second part of the survey to 
introduce the information market treatment.  
 
Digit Dash & Beyond Corporation (continued) 
The client decided to use a risk assessment tool to track the development progress of its 
transaction processing system. This tool is known as information market. An information 
market main goal is to collect information about the status of project objectives from all 
over the company to reveal whether or not they are being met. The more unmet 
objectives, the higher the riskiness level of the project. Information markets are known 
for their ability to quickly incorporate new updates and information to provide up-to-date 
assessment of the status of project objectives. 
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Appendix D: (Continued) 
This property is expected to bring system problems, performance issues or 
negative status information to the client attention very quickly. Trading in the 
information market is anonymous, and all transactions, bids and asks are maintained by 
an independent third party organization. Employees can report negative status 
information or system problems in an information market without being identified. The 
market offers incentives for true revelation of status information. So if employees are 
reporting honestly they will benefit financially. All profits will be directly deposited by 
the independent company into the employees‘ bank accounts to protect their identities. 
All individuals involved in the design and development of the system, or have any 
information about its progress, are participating in market trading. 
 
 
  
174 
 
Appendix E: Constructs and Measures  
Perceived information asymmetry (7 point likert scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = 
neutral or unsure, 7= strongly agree) 
IA1: Negative status information will become apparent to the client very quickly 
(Reversed) 
IA2: Whether or not I report negative status information, the client will become 
aware of it very soon anyway (Reversed) 
Perceived self-interest in reporting bad news (7 point likert scale, 1 = strongly 
disagree, 4 = neutral or unsure, 7= strongly agree) 
SI1: It is in my interest NOT to report negative status information in my report 
(Reversed) 
SI2: I will benefit from reporting negative status information in my report 
SI3: I have nothing to gain from reporting negative status information in my 
report (Reversed) 
Perceived anonymity (7 point likert scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neutral or unsure, 
7= strongly agree) 
AN1: If I mention negative status information in my status reports, management 
will know my name (Reversed) 
AN2: Project status reports at my firm are anonymous (i.e. reports have no names 
attached to them) 
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Appendix E: (Continued) 
Willingness to report bad news (7 point likert scale, 1 = very unlikely, 4 = neutral or 
unsure, 7= very likely) 
WL1: How likely are you to report negative status information in your status 
report? 
WL2: How likely are you to report negative status information to client? 
WL3: How likely it is that you would avoid reporting negative status information 
to client? (Reversed) 
NOTE: The questions asked in the second part of the survey under the treatment 
condition were identical except that ―status report/report‖ was replaced with information 
market. 
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